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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the value-adding partnership in commercializing a 
proprietary value-enhanced specialty grain - DuPont's High Oil Com, analyzes the decision­
makings along the value chain, and explains the governance structure of the value-adding 
partnership from the perspective of the theory of firm. It argues that private investment 
efforts play an important role in determining the governance structure, and the governance 
structure evolves with the evolution of the importance of those efforts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, agricultural products have been produced and traded as generic 
commodities. Grains are loosely classified in several grades based mainly on their physical 
attributes. Products from different farms lose their identities as soon as they enter marketing 
channels. They are co-mingled with products from other sources. Producers are anonymous. 
End-users simply accept what they get and have no idea where the supplies come from and 
nor does that matter, although final products processed from agricultural raw materials are 
often varied and differentiated. 
Despite the dominance of commodity production in the grain industry, there has 
always been an effort to produce a differentiated product that meets a specific need. Such 
are specialty grains. A specialty grain has intrinsic attributes that best meet the requirements 
of a particular group of customers, and can improve either production efficiency or end 
product quality. The identity of a specialty grain matters. It is almost exclusively traded out 
of the commodity system. 
Increasingly, the grain industry today is moving from a pure commodity focus to a 
quality value-added focus driven by technological innovation and value-seeking of all 
parties involved. As concerns for production efficiency and food safety are mounting, end-
users are increasingly interested in the quality and specific characteristics of the inputs they 
are using or consuming. But, the customization of agricultural production to its end-users 
has only taken off with the revolution of biotechnology. 
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In the grain industry, genetic engineering has focused for years on developing input-
specific traits such as herbicide-resistance and insect/disease resistance. In 1996, the first 
crop seeds improved through biotechnology became commercially available to growers in 
the U.S. (Cline and Esfeld, 1998). Among those that have achieved high commercial values 
are Bt Com and cotton and Roundup Ready Soybeans and Cotton (Hayenga, 1998).' 
However, some plant breeders have shifted their focus to develop output-specific traits that 
are selected, designed and grown for a specific group of customers and provide more value 
than their commodity counterparts in terms of productivity. These products are called value-
enhanced grain, or specialty grain to be distinguished from their commodity counterparts.^ 
There are a number of products in the pipelines from several firms including high lysine, 
methionine, and tryptophan com, and high oleic, low linoleic soybean oils and others 
(Hayenga, 1998). High Oil Com is a successfully commercialized value-enhanced com on 
the market. Although it is not genetically modified, it does share an important attribute with 
other genetically modified value-enhanced grains- the seed technology is proprietary. In 
fact, this new generation of hybrids is characterized by their patented genetic sequences or 
processes that have legal protection for a fixed period of time. Private firms are the leading 
force in this revolutionary innovation and hold the intellectual rights to the products they 
have created or bought. For example, the High Oil Com seed technology is owned by 
DuPont, different forms of Bt Com seed technology are separately owned by Monsanto, 
Dow, Novartis and AgrEvo, and the technology used to produce the popular Roundup Ready 
seeds is a property of Monsanto (Hayenga, 1998). 
' Bt Com (Bacillus thuringiensis) is resistant to European com borer and Roundup Ready seeds are resistant to 
herbicide Roundup. 
^ Value-enhanced grain and specialty grain are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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Biotechnology firms have invested substantially in R«ScD to bring the new product to 
the market, and to capture the value of their innovation is vital to their long-term survival. 
The crops with genetically enhanced input traits such as Bt com and Roundup Ready 
soybean are accepted by growers quickly, but the commercialization of value-enhanced 
grains faces more challenges due to the lack of established markets.^ Success in the 
commercialization of these proprietary value-enhanced crops hinges on the creation of a 
market for the new products, which requires close coordination among the players along the 
value chain. We call these relationships "value-adding partnerships". There has been 
considerable restructuring in the agricultural sector in order to develop and enhance such 
partnerships. We examine a special case - High Oil Com in the hope of shedding some light 
on potential changes in the market for other genetically modified value-enhanced grains. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of 
the value chain of a proprietary value-enhanced grain- High Oil Com (HOC) and its value-
adding partnerships. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on specialty com and general literature 
on value-adding partnerships. Chapter 4 presents the theoretical models. Empirical evidence 
is discussed in light of the models in Chapter 5. 
^ Bt Com was introduced in 1996 and captured 1% of the com acreage in that year, and attained 20% of the 
com acreage in 1998. For Roundup Ready soybean, the acreage percentage was 1% in 1996, and 37% in 1998. 
For Roundup Ready cotton, 6% in 1997 and 28% in 1998. High Oil Com, in contrast, was introduced in 1996, 
but attained 2% of com acres in 1998 (Hayenga, 1998). However, Genetically Modified Organizms (GMOs) 
face more opposition in Europe. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PROPRIETARY VALUE-ENHANCED GRAIN AND ITS VALUE-
ADDING PARTNERSHIPS 
2.1 A Proprietary Value-enhanced Specialty Grains-High Oil Corn 
Com is processed for consumer products, energy, sweeteners, starch, proteins, oils, 
animal feeds and other uses. Different users have different preferences for input 
characteristics. Com wet millers prefer soft-textured, thin perocarp kernels, while com dry 
millers want hard-textured kernels, and feed users like com that contains more oil. In the late 
1960s and early '70s, a specialty com, high lysine com, was produced and identity preserved 
for livestock use. Today, the most common specialty types are high oil, white, waxy and 
high-amylose com, and the most successfully commercialized using proprietary technology 
is the Optimum High Oil Com (HOC). 
2.1.1 What is HOC? 
HOC is directed at the animal feed industry. The single biggest use of com is as an 
animal feed ingredient. Over 60% of the com consumed within the U.S. is fed to animals 
and so are most of the exports. Overall, an estimated 80% of com produced in this country is 
used as animal feed. Com is a major ingredient for virtually every species of livestock. Two 
crucial traits for quality improvement in this use are higher energy and improved protein 
quality (Renkoski, 1997). The typical yellow dent com on the market, with an average 4% 
oil content, has to be supplemented by more expensive and concentrated ingredients such as 
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fat, high protein concentrates, and synthetic amino acids in a typical ration to optimize 
performance. HOC is modified to contain a high level of oil. With 7.5% oil content on 
average, it can be used to substitute for animal fat and a portion of the soybean meal in a 
typical ration, and allows livestock producers to increase feed efficiency (Optimum's 
website)"^. HOC is more valuable as an animal feed ingredient than commodity com. 
2.1.2 History of Optimum HOC 
Dupont first became interested in HOC in 1986, although research on it had begun 
long before (Renkoski, 1997). Through a research and commercialization program with 
Holdens Foundation Seed Company, Pfister Hybrid Com Company, and a number of other 
collaborating hybrid com companies, Dupont developed and marketed high oil com under 
the OfTIMUM brand (Feedstuffs). It bought out all business and technology rights to HOC 
from Pfister Hybrid Com Co. and Holden's Foundation Seeds on Feb. 18, 1996 (Feedstuffs, 
March 3, 1996), and became the sole owner of HOC technology. 
On Jan 1, 1996, Dupont and a leading seed company. Pioneer Hi-bred International, 
set up a joint venture called Optimum Quality Grains to discover and develop quality-
improved grains, of which HOC is a major product. Dupont had licensed its technology to 
58 seed companies to produce HOC seeds by 1997^. In August 1997, Dupont announced a 
plan to invest $1.7 billion for a 20% percent stake in Pioneer (Agri Marketing), and it 
promised to honor its agreements with other seed companies that market Optimum HOC, 
although Pioneer would be the preferred supplier. Growers sign a contract with Dupont to 
•* See Appendix 3 for more about the value of HOC. 
^ The high oil line characteristic is concentrated in an inbred line that DuPont supplies as the male pollinator 
with male sterile high yielding strains of com. 
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buy seeds from licensed seed companies. They can produce HOC for their own feed uses, or 
for contracts with designated elevators. Subsequently, in March 1999, DuPont acquired 
Pioneer. DuPont bought out the 80% equity stake in Pioneer that it did not already own, and 
Pioneer became an independent subsidiary wholly owned by DuPont. The joint venture. 
Optimum Quality Grains will be a wholly owned subsidiary of DuPont as well (SEC Filing, 
1999). 
2.1.3 Export Of HOC 
A big market for HOC is overseas; demand in Latin America, Asia and Middle East 
is growing. The U.S. exports 20% of its com crop and a significant amount of value-added 
products every year. As a substitute for oil, HOC is even more appealing overseas, where fat 
is relatively more expensive than in the U.S. or forbidden to be used by some religions. Fat 
is cheap in the U.S as a by-product of a huge livestock industry, but transportation costs 
makes it undesirable to export. In early 1996, Dupont formed a partnership with Continental 
Grain to market HOC overseas (Feedstuffs, 1996) and to "develop efficient value chains to 
assure customers of a consistent, dependable, and high quality supply tailored to their needs" 
(Hammes, 1996). In about five years, production of HOC grew from virtually zero acres in 
1993 to approximately 900,000 acres planted in 1998 and 1.25 million acres estimated for 
1999 (Reuters, 1999). Dupont entered into contracts with growers to produce Optimium 
HOC for export markets on approximately 150,000 acres in 1996 out of 300,000 acres 
actually planted in that year. Acreage for export in 1997 was estimated to approach 350,000, 
which will produce approximately one million tons of high oil com and accounts for half of 
the total production (700,(X)0 acres) contracted with Dupont (OPTIMUM University, 1997). 
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When Continental Grain's grain business was bought out by its rival- Cargill- in late 
1998, Optimum Quality Grain discontinued its agreement with Continental. As a result, on 
June 1999, Optimum Quality Grain entered into marketing agreements with Archer Daniels 
Midland (ADM) and ConAgra Trade Group to manage the growing export demand for 
Optimum HOC (Feedstuffs, 1999). Currently, Optimum has three grain exporting partners-
Consolidated Grain & Barge, ADM, and ConAgra Trade Group. 
2.2 Value-adding Partnerships (VAP) in General 
A value-adding partnership is defined as "a set of independent companies that work 
closely together to manage the flow of goods and/or services along the entire value-added 
chain" (Johnston and Lawrence, 1988, P.94). A value-added chain refers to the various steps 
a good or service goes through from raw materials to final consumption. The transactions 
between stages in the chain are traditionally carried out either by an arm's length market or 
by hierarchies of conmion ownership, while intermediate governance forms exist between 
two adjacent stages. Williamson (1991) describes these intermediate forms that lie on the 
continuum between market and hierarchy as hybrid. A VAP, usually accomplished by 
contractual relationships, is one of the hybrids. It provides close coordination among all 
members of the value chain, but falls short of vertical integration. 
2.2.1 Contract production 
In the case of specialty grains, VAP is almost the only observed organizational form 
governing the processor and grower relationship. Contract production has been the norm for 
specialty grains. 
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Specialty grains can potentially add value to users and end processors, but achieving 
that value requires the preservation of identity, otherwise the value will be diluted or lost 
when mixed with other com that doesn't have these special attributes. The current grain 
handling, transporting and trading system is organized to efficiently move large quantities of 
relatively generic commodities over long distances. Specialty grains are targeted at quality 
traits that are not yet measured in standard grades but which have a substantial impact on the 
grain's value for a particular user. The volume of specialty grains is relatively small, making 
the cost of segregating them within the current system very high, sometimes, prohibitively 
so. This poses a huge challenge for production and marketing. Without a guaranteed 
marketing channel, growers are hesitant to grow a specialty grain without a buyer, 
particularly when the grain has limited uses or a promised price premium if its yield is lower 
than normal grain and/or seed price is higher. The management of an identity-preserved 
system with small volume requires an industrial structure that is different from that of 
commodity production. Without such a system, the added value of specialty grain won't be 
realized. When a large volume is achieved, a specialty grain becomes a "super-commodity", 
and it can be managed as a different variety of grain just like other traditional commodities. 
As a result, a contract production system is used for specialty grain with small 
volumes that fall short of being a "super commodity". At the beginning of the production 
season, processors offer contracts to growers for them to grow certain specialty grain for 
them at some price premium above the open market commodity price. This has been done 
between domestic users and growers. 
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2.2.2 Alternative Arrangements 
As explained before, it is difficult for specialty grain to be exchanged through open 
market transactions due to small volume, diseconomy in handling, and the small number of 
buyers. A successful farm operation still requires close, personal supervision and skill. This 
creates obstacles for nonfarm processors who wish to vertically integrate into grain 
production (Kohls and Uhl), due to monitoring costs associated with moral hazard. Besides, 
there are possibly financial constraints, and /or legal constraints, let alone farmers' 
resistance. Vertical relationships based on trust or reputation are much talked about in the 
literature, but ones involving specialty grain growers are not observed. Trust is hard to 
establish when many small players are involved. That specialty grain contracts usually last 
for only one planting season makes it even harder. 
When more players are incorporated into the value chain, as is true with proprietary 
value-enhanced grains, contractual relationships get more complicated. Partnerships in the 
forms of alliances and agreements, joint ventures, or outright ownership emerge as the sector 
evolves. These relationships differ in the degree of control and coordination. Ownership 
confers the largest amount of control and makes maximum coordination possible. Partners 
share control and coordination over joint ventures and close coordination can be achieved. 
Control over alliances is rather weaker, but the degree of coordination is still much higher 
than through the arm's length market, especially when the relationship is intended to be 
long-term. In relationships between large established firms, reputation and trust may play 
some role, but they cannot safeguard opportunistic tiehaviors to such an extent that 
governance structures are no longer important when contracts are incomplete. 
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2.3 Value-adding Partnerships In HOC 
2.3.1 The Value Chain of Proprietary Specialty Grain and Exporting of HOC 
As Renkoski (1997) and other industrial experts point out, the value chain for 
proprietary specialty grains consists of trait developer, seed companies, growers, evlevators 
and grain companies, and end-users. At the beginning of the chain is trait development. This 
includes the technology available to seed companies to develop new seed products. Next, 
grain farmers convert the seeds into value added grain, while elevators that are owned by the 
exporting grain companies serve as a collection and storage point for the grain. Grain and 
transportation companies move the grain to processors who convert it into value-added food, 
feed, or industrial products'^. 
For the value chain of HCXi: export, Dupont is the technology provider, seed 
companies produce seeds using Dupont's technology, and the growers buy the seeds and 
produce the grain. Elevators and grain firms channel the identity-preserved grains to the 
end-users (See Figure 1). 
2.3.2 Decision-making along the Value Chain 
The value-added chain works only if all the parties cooperate. Obviously, all of them 
have outside options and can choose to trade with others. Therefore, the system is viable 
only if everyone gains more by participating than otherwise, and the prerequisite is that there 
exists net added value compared with commodity com, namely, the added value to end users 
minus the added costs of producing and marketing is positive. As mentioned above, the 
® The value chain is shorter for growers who feed the grain to their own livestocks where no elevators or grain 
companies are needed to complete the transaction. 
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Seed technology 
DuPont 
icensing fee or dividends 
Grain 
Company 
Figure 1: The Value Chain of HOC Export 
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marketing cost for specialty grain is higher than for commodities. On the production side, 
stacking genetic traits onto the seeds often drags down yield. To keep the specialty grain 
separated during the growing, harvesting, and storing adds cost on the farm as well. Let's 
evaluate each party's decision separately. 
Dupont: Dupont is the technology provider. The technology would be useless if not 
commercialized. The goal for Dupont is to capture as much value as the technology can 
produce so as to recover the sunk and continued cost of research and development and to 
make a profit. Potentially, it can sell its technology to an outside party, or retain ownership 
and participate in the later stages of value creation through licensing or direct production. 
Dupont has chosen the latter. "We work to create new grain production, identity 
preservation and marketing systems to deliver and capture the added value we've created.... 
Delivering and capturing value is just as important as creating it, so our goal is to do both in 
tandem," said Hammes, a manager at OPTIMUM Quality Grain, on the launching of 
company in 1996. 
Seed Companies: These firms, if they choose to buy or license technology from 
Dupont, are intending to collect a price premium for their seeds to compensate for the 
production costs incurred and the license fee paid to Dupont. Strategic goals like capturing 
market shares are also possible. Complications such as interbrand competition might arise 
too. 
Growers; They can be divided into two groups. One group produces com for its own 
feed use, the other for adding income. For the first group, the producers are also end-users, 
no marketing channel is needed and no marketing cost is incurred. As long as there is a 
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benefit, HOC will be produced. For the second group, a price premium should be guaranteed 
before production is started when there is yield drag and more variability. Because end users 
and growers are geographically dispersed, the probability that growers will sell HOC at a 
price premium to the right customers on the open market is very low after harvest^. Besides, 
the verification of the grain's intrinsic characteristics is another issue. Therefore, for this 
group of growers to participate, a contract production system is needed, which is what we 
actually observe. A regional market can develop between cash growers and their 
neighboring feeders, but contracts are still needed to safeguard opportunistic behavior. To 
determine the terms of contracts, the net returns that a grower anticipates from alternative 
crops will form the lower limit of what he will accept to produce HOC. Notably, most 
contracts for specialty grains including those for HOC, guarantee a fixed premium added to 
the spot market price of commodity grain at the time of transaction rather than a fixed future 
price. Theoretically, growers can always use the well-developed future and option markets 
to manage the commodity price uncertainty. 
Elevators and Grain Companies: They are the connecting points between the 
second group of producers and end-users. Their function is to buy HOC from producers, to 
preserve its identity and to deliver it to the particular targeted users. During the introduction 
period, when users are not familiar with the new product, considerable marketing efforts are 
needed to create a market. To identity preserve HOC, investment in additional capacity 
(dedicated asset) has to be made in some cases®. 
^ Breakthroughs in communications like internet help to lessen the matching problems between growers and 
end-users, but can't solve the problem completely. 
® Continental renovated its facility at E. St. Louis to provide direct loading of value-added commodities, such 
as high oil com and other specialty grains. Feedstuffs, 1996 
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End-users; They are the ultimate source of value creation. The new product, HOC, 
with superior quality, is compared to its closest substitute- typical grade 2 yellow com, and 
other feed supplements such as fat. Given all the prices, a feed ration is optimized to 
minimize cost per pound of weight gain or maximize breeding and reproduction 
performance. In the milling process, equipment that is specific to processing HCXI! has to be 
bought and employed. For example, Gold'n Plump poultry, opened a new feed mill in 
Arcadia, Wisconsin which was specifically built to handle high oil com and other specialty 
grains in 1997.These are also relationship-specific investments. Because of this fixed 
investment, a certain level of scale and continuous supply has to be guaranteed to make the 
use of HOC economical. Consistent quality of the supply is another key for the acceptance 
of the new product. 
2.3.3 Industry Structure 
As the sole provider of technology, Dupont is no doubt a monopoly and has the 
market power to maximize its gain, but this power is weakened by the lack of an established 
marketing channel, which calls for the cooperation of grain companies to create a market for 
HOC. Competition also comes from substitute products such as commodity com and fat, a 
byproduct from many food processing operations. 
The past couple of years have witnessed much consolidation of the seed industry and 
even more is likely. By late 1998, most seed companies of significant size and/or with 
biotech assets had been acquired or aligned with large chemical firms (Wall Street Journal, 
Sept. 29, 1998). The seed market is dominated by a handful of big firms, though there are 
still a number of small independent seed firms spread across the mid-west. Pioneer and 
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Monsanto control more than half of the North American Seed Com market, with Pioneer 
having more than 40% of the market share. (Hayenga, 1998) The seed market can be 
characterized as two or three market leaders with a number of followers. With the 
acquisition of Pioneer, DuPont can virtually set the premium for HOC seeds directly through 
Pioneer and indirectly via license fees it charges other seed firms subject to the participation 
of other parties along the value chain. 
Growers, traditionally small, and large in number, are competitive price takers. They 
do not possess market power either in obtaining seeds and others inputs, or in bargaining 
with elevators. But they do have alternatives to producing HOC. 
Local elevators are geographical monopolies, but competition is intense. Major grain 
companies have elevators spreading across the grain belts. Exporting grain companies face 
competition from others, but at the introductory stage, the small volume of HOC can not 
supply a large number of firms with a sufficient quantity to obtain their efficient operating 
levels. Very likely only one or possibly two such firms can exist in the market. Together 
with elevators, grain companies can set the price premium of HOC, subject to the 
participation constraints of growers and end users, if no objection comes from Dupont. The 
com market is competitive with a large number of sellers and buyers, as are most feed 
supplement markets. The value of HOC will ultimately be determined competitively by its 
quality and the prices of its substitutes. The price of HOC to end users (processors), on the 
other hand, will be bargained upon when only a handful of big buyers are involved and 
specific equipment is needed to process HOC. 
What we observe: DuPont formed an alliance and then acquired one of the biggest 
seed companies- Pioneer HiBred International. It has licensed its technology to a number of 
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seed Hmis. It signs prcxluction contracts with growers to use seeds from designated seed 
firms, and worked with Continental Grain and later on with others to market HCX^ overseas. 
DuPont also formed a joint venture with Pioneer-Optimum Quality Grain to market HOC 
and other value-enhanced grains overseas, which is wholly owned after the acquisition of 
Pioneer. In this value chain, all the parties are connected with contracts or agreements 
except the link between growers and seed companies (See Figure 2). 
Licensing or ownership Seed Conipanies DuPont * 
Grain 
Conpany Cash Growers 
End Users 
Figure 2; The Structure of the Value Chain of HOC Export 
This structure of the HOC value chain is closely related to the fact that HOC is a new-
differentiated product produced with privately owned technology aimed at a specific niche 
market. With relevance for similar products that have or will come out in agricultural and 
other industries, it will be interesting and rewarding to look into the nature of the contractual 
17 
relationships among the parties involved in HOC. This is especially true, when research in 
agricultural development is shifting from public funded institutions to privately owned 
firms, and private firms are at the forefront in the ongoing wave of commercializing 
biotechnology in the agricultural production. Although biotech has come under criticisms 
and there are increasing attention on the controversies of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs), we expect that research and developments will go on in this field and new 
products will be introduced in the future as we learn more about the GMOs. 
2.4 Recent Restructuring in the Agribusiness Sector 
Besides the emerging of value-adding partnership in exporting proprietary value-
enhanced grains such as HOC, there has been considerable restructuring among the players 
along the value chain. The restructuring includes mergers and acquisitions among the 
chemicals, biotech and seed firms, the split between drug and agribusiness, alliances 
established between biotech firms and grain companies and consolidation of the grain 
companies 
Consolidation between chemicals, biotech and seed firms: The consolidation 
between chemical giants, biotech firms and seed companies is characterized by mergers in 
the chemical and biotech sector and their subsequent acquisition of seed companies. By late 
1998, "most seed companies have either aligned themselves with, or been acquired by, crop-
biotechnology juggemauts such as Monsanto Co., DuPont Co. and Dow Chemical Co." 
(Wall Street Journal 9/29/98) A seed firm, Cargill, which didn't have access to 
biotechnology and the new genetic products produced by it, tried to sell its domestic seed 
' See Appendix 1 for a detailed report on the activities of individual firms. 
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business to AgrEvo and its international seed business to Monsanto (Heffeman). Now, there 
are hardly any significant independent biotech assets left in this sector. In the meantime, the 
leading global biotech firms have obtained access to the seed market through merger and 
acquisitions. 
We observe: 
• Most major acquisitions of seed firms occurred after 1996 when the first seeds with 
input traits modified by biotechnology started to be commercialized. 
• Most major acquisitions followed previous collaboration relationships such as joint 
ventures, research partnerships, and minority equity investment by biotech firms in seed 
companies. (DuPont/Pioneer, Monsant/Dekalb, Dow Agrosciences/Mycogen) 
• No seed firms of significant size are now independent of big biotech and chemical firms. 
• Seed firms were acquired by biotech and chemical firms, not the other way around. 
That the consolidation and commercialization of genetically modified products 
occurred around the same time is no coincidence. The seeds with genetically modified input 
traits have made a big impact on the crop protection products, and will continue to do so in 
the future. According to Hayenga (1999), the acreage treated for European Com Borer in 
1998 dropped by approximately 2 million acres, a 30% reduction from the previous year, 
due to low ECB population and the substitution of Bt Com varieties. The number of soybean 
acres treated with Roundup doubled in 1998, with most competitors having their market 
share drop by one-third to one-half. Thus the impact of biotech seeds on the chemicals is 
twofold. The insect-resistant seeds such as Bt products reduce the need for chemical 
treatment and thus the demand for the correspondent insecticides. These seeds serve as a 
substitute for chemicals. The herbicide-resistant seeds such as Roundup Ready products 
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increase the demand for the resisted herbicide, but reduce the demand for non-compatible 
herbicides. These seeds are complementary products of certain chemicals, but foreclose the 
use of other non-compatible products. 
Biotechnology must be combined with seed technology to successfully develop a 
new generation of seeds. In cases the biotech firms choose to participate in the creation of a 
value-enhanced grain market, the seed firms' extensive distribution network is very 
valuable. Therefore, the biotech, chemical and seed technologies become increasingly 
complementary. 
Most acquisitions followed a previous collaboration relationship. For instance, 
before DuPont bought out Pioneer, it had a research alliance agreement with and equity 
investment in Pioneer. The reason for the acquisition was that, as the proxy for the merger 
says, "the need to obtain the mutual consent of our two organizations to pursue opportunities 
and differences of opinions as to how to divide the costs and rewards of these opportunities 
were hampering our ability to develop new products as efficiently as possible." ( SEC Filing 
I3E3, P.l) 
Split between drug and agribusiness: After the flurry of mergers between drug and 
agricultural biotech firms to create a "life-science" conglomerate in the earlier years, there is 
a trend going in the reverse direction-some firms are splitting their pharmaceutical and 
agribusiness. 
Wall street analysts and economists cite the reason for the spin-offs is that 
agribusiness seemed not to offer synergies with the other healthcare divisions. The life 
sciences strategy, that marries fields such as biotech drugs, nutrition and agriculture to seek 
synergies from businesses ranging from farming and livestock to drugs and human nutrition, 
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does not seem to pay off. The agri-biotech assets and pharmaceutical assets are not as 
complementary as was originally thought. 
Alliances between biotech flmts and grain companies: Several biotech firms have 
formed alliances with grain companies to create markets for value-enhanced grains. The 
alliances between biotech and grain companies are generally in the form of joint ventures 
and marketing agreements. Outright acquisitions of grain companies by biotech firms are not 
yet seen. 
Consolidation of the grain companies: Joint ventures and acquisitions are common 
among grain companies as well. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in this sector increase the 
market power of the resulting firms without significantly increasing or decreasing 
employees' incentives. The physical assets that provide economies of scale and scope may 
be more important than the human assets. And economies of scale and scope may be the 
main reason for the consolidations in the grain sector. 
Biotech firms integrate into downstream- grain processing: There is not much 
direct integration by biotech firms into grain processing sector, although biotech firms such 
as DuPont believe that it is important for them to work with end-users to gather information 
on the specific demands of customers'". However, integration by grain companies into 
processing are much more common. 
DuPont did acquire Protein Technologies International, a supplier of soy proteins to the food and paper 
processing industries in December 1997. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Previous Literature on Specialty Grain Production 
Historicaliy. contract production, or any other sort of vertical coordination in the 
grain industry has been limited, except forward contracting of prices, and contracts with the 
federal government to participate in price and income support programs, along with acreage 
set-aside agreements (Lajili, et. al., 1997). These programs provide a means of risk 
management. But specialty grain production has always relied on contractual arrangements. 
These arrangements are usually written or oral agreements between a producer and a 
specialty crop end-user (or supplier to an end-user), established prior to the production 
season. In addition to quantity, price and some general or industry standard quality level, 
these contracts often specify inputs such as the variety of seeds and production practices to 
be used by the supplier. The processor is actually taking some control over the supplier's 
production practices through the contracts. Changes in government programs and consumer 
demand, aided by new technologies, are leading to more specialty crop production, and as a 
result, contract production (Coaldrake and Sonka, 1993). Contracts have been used more 
frequently in fruit and vegetable products. 
Theoretical studies on specialty com or grain production per se are scarce, as 
specialty grain production itself has been. Earlier studies focus on its risk and return aspect. 
Kliebenstein and Hill's (1971) paper on com high in Amylopectin or Amylose starch which 
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was contract produced and identity preserved for firms manufacturing starch is an example. 
They compared returns from alternative contracts at various price levels. 
There are several more recent empirical papers stimulated by renewed interest in 
specialty crops. Coaldrake and Sonka (1993) explore characteristic and attitude differences 
among contracting high-value crop producers and non-contracting producers. They used a 
survey sample of East Central Illinois farmers and found that contracting producers are 
younger and better educated, with fewer years of farm experience, but farm and rent more 
acreage than non-contracting producers. 
Farmers' preferences for crop contracts are studied by Lajili and others. Their 
approach is an empirical one that combines elements of principal-agent theory and 
transaction cost economics. They hypothetically offered farmers a range of contracts that 
differ in uncertainty and level of relationship-specific investment, and observe which one 
was chosen. The statistical results from the experiments indicate that asset specification and 
uncertainty, along with selected business and personal characteristics significantly influence 
farmers' preferences for contractual arrangements, as one would expect from transaction 
cost theory. 
Weleschuk and Kerr (1995) also employed the transaction cost approach. They 
studied the sharing of risk and returns in prairie special crops in Western Canada. Farmers 
have a choice of either signing a production contract with a buyer prior to planting the crop, 
or selling the crop after harvest to a limited number of buyers. An open spot market does not 
exist due to the small number of buyers and sellers. The contracts in use are shown to give 
more power to buyers than to sellers. Ex post bargaining is not efficient due to the 
information disadvantage of farmers and the poor prospect of alternative-traditional prairie 
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crops. Farmers receive less return from their investments and thus invest less than the 
efficient level. The authors suggest that government intervention aimed at providing 
information to farmers is desirable to improve efficiency. 
A number of papers study the impact of biotechnology on the structural changes in 
the agricultural sector. Shimoda (1998) notes that the combination of "the technology and 
delivery vehicle" such as biotechnology firms and seed firms and "commercialization 
structure" such as marketing and distribution channels is essential to the success in the 
commercialization of agricultural biotechnology. As a result, "multi-dimensional vertical 
and horizontal linkages" will form "agricultural industrial complexes". Heffeman (1999) 
uses the "cluster of firms" to represent the new economic arrangements in the food and 
agricultural system. He predicts that four or five food chain clusters that control the food 
system from gene to supermarket shelf will emerge and compete against each other. Lemer 
and Tsai (1999) examine the contract structure of the alliances within the biotechnology 
sector. They found that contract structure does matter and those designed consistent with the 
theory perform significantly better. 
3.2 The New Theory of Firm 
The agricultural industry, as a whole, has witnessed increasing vertical coordination 
and product differentiation at the farm level, which is seen by some as "the industrialization 
of agriculture" (Hurt, 1994). The undifferentiated products and open markets characterizing 
many agricultural commodity markets are evolving toward the differentiated products and 
the contractual or integrated or controlled-supply markets that have typically characterized 
the manufacturing sectors of the economy (Sporleder, 1992). 
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The new theory of firm, transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson 
1979,1985) and incomplete contracting and property rights analysis (Hart, 1995) in 
particular, provide a new framework other than the traditional production function approach 
to understand this dramatic structural change. 
The transaction cost theory, which started with Coase's famous 1937 paper and 
extensively developed by Williamson and others, views a firm as a governance structure 
rather than a production function. So the "boundary of the firm is no longer defined by 
technology but is something to be derived from comparative transaction cost considerations" 
(Williamson, 1994). Transaction costs arise because of bounded rationality, opportunism, 
and asset specificity. In a complex world full of uncertainty, it is impossible to anticipate all 
the contingencies possible in the future. Therefore, long term contracts are inherently 
incomplete. Safeguards are needed because economic agents tend to behave 
opportunistically and seek self-interest whenever possible. Opportunism in the presence of 
transaction specific investments or "appropriable quasi-rents" as referred to by Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian (1978) will lead to the hold up problem, which is a leading factor in 
explaining the existence of vertical integration. To safeguard a transaction against 
opportunistic behaviors requires credible commitments at the beginning of a contractual 
relationship. Choices of governance structures are viewed as farsighted response to the ex 
post hazards of opportunism in a world of long-term, incomplete contracts implemented 
under uncertainty. 
The transaction cost theory implies that there is less haggling and hold-up problems 
within a merged firm, but it doesn't provide an answer to why (Hart, 1995). The property 
rights theory, on the other hand, attempts to answer this question. According to the property 
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rights approach, ownership of physical or nonhuman assets matter when contracts are 
incomplete. Ownership confers the residual control rights of the assets and is a source of 
power when it is impossible to write a verifiable contract that could be enforced in a court of 
law and specifies the efforts or outputs of the parties involved. Therefore, ownership is a 
scarce resource that must be allocated optimally to maximize the surplus from any economic 
relationship. The theory argues that ownership structures affect the efforts of the contracting 
parties, and it is generally optimal for ownership of assets to be assigned to the party with 
the greatest marginal ability to affect the outcome. 
The foundation of property rights theory-incomplete contracting has been challenged 
(Che & Hausch, 1999; Hart & More, 1999). Maskin & Tirole (1999) attack its lack of 
rigorous foundations by developing a number of irrelevance theorems that show contracts 
can be designed to overcome ex ante indescribability of trade. But Hart & Moore (1999) 
counter with a model providing a foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete. 
Several authors argue that some carefully designed contacts can solve the holdup problem 
that plagues relationship-specific investments. Examples are Chung (1991) and Aghion et al. 
(1994). However, Che & Hausch (1999) criticize these works for assuming the ex ante 
manipulation of bargaining power. Furthermore, they show that when the relationship-
specific investment is sufficiently cooperative in the sense that the investment generates a 
direct benefit for the trading partner, there exists an intermediate range of bargaining shares 
for which contracting has no value; and all contracting becomes worthless in improving 
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efficiency when both investments are purely cooperative". Therefore, even if contracting 
can safeguard some selfish investments, cooperative investment must be safeguarded by 
organizational arrangements such as allocating property rights. 
A number of researchers have explored the implications of the modem theories of 
the firm for the evolving agricultural sectors (Barry et. al., Splorleder, Schrader, Knoeber, 
and Frank and Henderson, and others). They have primarily focused on the reasons 
underlying the increasing vertical coordination within the value-added chain. Theories of the 
firm are rightly resorted to a tool of analyses. Vertical coordination is studied as an 
alternative to open market transactions. 
3.3 Relevance of Previous Literature to High OH Corn 
The HOC system and specialty grains in general are part of the industrializing trend 
in agriculture, as far as product differentiation and closer ties between vertical stages are 
concerned. However, coordination forms vary across different sectors, ranging from 
minimum to complete common ownership. Contracts, generally referred to as any form of 
vertical coordination that falls short of common ownership control, differ greatly in the 
number of decisions influenced by the contract, the sharing of costs and risks, and the 
specificity of the terms. For instance, forward price contracting in grain, cattle, and hogs 
specifies some of the product characteristics that will be acceptable and the basis of 
payment. Neither party exerts much vertical control. Such contracts are called market-
specification contracts. Contracts in specialty grain often specify certain production 
'' Che & Hausch define cooperative investment as the investment made by one party that generates a direct 
benefit for its trading partner. Those that only benefit the investing party are called selfish investment. The 
cooperative investment is "pure" when it has no (or negative) accompanying direct benefit on the investing 
party. (Che & Hausch, 1999) 
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resources (such as seeds) to be used and sometimes producers get managerial help and 
supervision from contract providers. But product prices are usually based on the open 
market. In the broiler industry, not only are most inputs provided by integrators, part or all 
of the market price and income risks are shifted from producers to integrators (Knoeber and 
Thurman, 1995). The latter is also true in the hog sector where production contracts are 
mainly between big producers who have production of their own and growers who do 
finishing (Rhodes, 1995). The last two forms are referred to generally as contract 
production. 
But the degree of the contract provider's control over producers is much smaller in 
specialty grain than in livestock. This is related to differences in the production process. 
Structural changes in livestock industries are primarily driven by the technological advances 
that have standardized production processes and concentrated production space. By contrast, 
crop production is still more of an art and is more resistant to outside monitoring. Specialty 
grain contracts are a result of the lack of an open market for the specific qualities produced. 
Such diversity calls for close examination of the specificity in each sector. 
Studies on specialty grain production have focused almost exclusively on producers-
their risk and return (Kliebenstein and Hill, 1971), their characteristics and attitudes, etc. 
The other partner-either the processor or its agent-is rarely considered. The partnership of 
value creating and value-sharing is missing. For HOC and other proprietary value-enhanced 
grains, a niche market must be created as opposed to the traditional commodity grain 
market. The need to coordinate the players along the value chain calls for more than just 
contract production. In fact, contract production is only one element of this complex system. 
More importantly, we observe that close alignments are established between biotech firms 
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and seed firms, and alliances are formed between the technology provider and grain 
companies. There are several interesting questions to ask: what forces shape the 
relationships among all the partners? How are they determined optimally? How will they 
evolve over time? Is it market power or efficiency that is at work? Some researchers and 
policy makers are concerned that market power of large firms is squeezing small 
independent growers in this process, and some argue that efficiency might be the key. The 
answer will vary across different sectors where technology and degree of vertical 
coordination differ. A detailed study of this special case-DuPont's HOC will shed some light 
on the answer for the proprietary specialty grain sector. 
This dissertation will attempt to answer the questions proposed above. Since much 
has been written about contract production per se, and since growers play a rather passive 
role in this value chain, our focus will be on the strategic partnership between Dupont, seed 
companies, grain companies, and Dupont's leading role in creating a market. In fact, what 
distinguishes the value-adding partnership of HOC and other proprietary value-enhanced 
gains is the participation and the leading role of the proprietary technology owner. 
The approach employed in this paper is an incomplete contracting paradigm along 
the theory developed by Grossman &. Hart (1986), Hart & Moore (1988) and others. We 
recognize that at least during the introductory stage of commercializing proprietary value-
enhanced grains, incontractible relationship-specific private investments are significant and 
important, and therefore, play a significant role in shaping the construction of the 
participants' relationships. We will focus on the alliances between the technology provider 
and the grain companies, but will generalize the results to explain the other observed 
restructuring in the sector. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORETICAL MODELS 
4.1 Conjectures 
When a new technology producing a new product is first introduced, uncertainty 
regarding both the technology itself and the new product is high. Thus the value of the 
technology is uncertain. The value will depend on the value of the product it produces. But it 
takes time and effort for customers to leam about and accept a new product. Eight out of ten 
new products introduced on the market fail every year. The cost of developing a new market 
might discourage any outside party from undertaking the venture. Without demand, the 
value of the technology is virtually zero. In order to realize and possibly increase the value 
of this new technology, the innovator (Dupont for HCXI!) may have to participate in market-
creating efforts. 
Another factor that could contribute to Dupont's involvement in the later stages of 
value creation lies in the life cycle of the technology. During the introduction period, the 
technology is immature and continued research effort on the part of Dupont is crucial to 
popularize and enhance the production. Technical assistance from Dupont is essential to 
growers, the yield performance of HOC has potential to be improved and more research and 
development is needed. But this fact per se does not necessarily lead to the replacement of 
arm's length market with contractual relationships, because conceptually these services 
could be bought and sold in the form of a market transaction. It is the noncontractibility of 
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Dupont's effort that makes an arm's length relationship ineffective. That effort is subject to 
uncertainty and measurement difficulty, and therefore is not fungible. As a result. 
Continental or other grain companies will be reluctant to buy technical support or research 
from Dupont on the open market. On the other hand, Dupont will be reluctant to give up its 
technology at early stages, since more value can be expected with incremental investment in 
R&D. Besides, the strategic focus of Dupont, as a company, is shifting from the old-line 
chemical industry to the more promising life science sector. 
We can also postulate that Dupont might buy out a grain company, but the lack of 
expertise in grain trade would possibly discourage that effort. It is difficult to manage two 
distinct lines of business, as has been demonstrated by many business failures blamed on 
shifting from the core business and losing focus. A contractual relationship that bypasses the 
grain companies between Dupont and domestic processors is feasible, but with overseas 
users, an efficient marketing and handling channel is a must. To preserve the autonomy of 
the grain company, an intermediate form, such as partial equity ownership, may be 
preferable to outright vertical integration. 
Given that HOC can add value to end-users, and the economies of scale exist in 
marketing, the constraint in market development lies in growers' willingness to produce 
HOC. Positive externalities exist at the production level through leaming-by-doing and at 
the marketing level through scale economies. But an individual grower would not take this 
into account when making a production decision. Following the infant industry argument, 
subsidies to growers in the forms of higher price premiums and lower seed prices at the 
early stage should be welfare improving for the system as a whole. The question is who will 
bear the cost of subsidy? Only the one who has the power to control the whole system and to 
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influence the value distribution has an incentive to do so. Here this party is Dupont, which 
owns the most indispensable factor in the production-technology. Being a big conglomerate, 
Dupont also has the financial ability to endure some losses in hope of getting larger return 
later. 
As a technology matures and becomes more standardized, there will be less need for 
the technology provider to participate in downstream transactions unless it is of strategic 
significance. In view of the huge demand for feed com, HOC, if it successfully overcomes 
its yield lags and volatility over time, may capture the whole feed com market. If that is the 
case, the volume of its transactions will justify its being traded on the commodity market 
just like a separate grade of com. However, identity preservation will remain an issue if it is 
more costly to produce HOC and/or if HOC commands a price premium over other coms. 
Contract production will remain as an option if testing costs are high enough. Otherwise, no 
contract production will be needed. More grain companies will enter the market and 
competition will prevail. 
The industry structure in the grain industry has been constantly changing. 
Biotechnology is the force underlying the current restmcturing. Crop seeds improved 
through biotechnology (including soybean, com, cotton and potatoes) have been 
commercialized, and more genetically enhanced products are on the way. Those 
technologies are mostly developed and patented by private firms, and are by nature 
proprietary intellectual rights. Commercializing the new technologies, especially those 
involving value-added traits such as HOC, requires an innovative approach involving 
changes in relationships along the value chain. The implication for HOC is that we expect to 
see more coordination at the infancy stage of an industry and less in a mature one. 
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4.2 Grower's Acreage Decisions 
Much research has been done on acreage response functions in agriculture. 
Increasing evidences show that risk and/or risk behavior are important in agricultural 
production decisions (Behrman, Just, Lin, Traill). Expected utility maximization is a useful 
framework to approximate farmers' decisions under uncertainty'". Chavas and Holt (1990) 
show that expected utility maximization could not be rejected for the U.S. com and soybean 
acreage decisions. 
This paper will utilize the expected utility maximization approach to derive the 
acreage response of HOC growers to price premiums. Since com production acreage is 
relatively stable year by year, the decision can be simplified as a representative grower 
allocating resources between commodity com and HOC for a given total com acreage. 
4.2.1 Setup 
• Consider a grower who decides to allocate A acres of land to producing com in the 
coming season. Let A1 denote the number of acres devoted to commodity com, and 
A2=A-A I acres devoted to HOC. 
There are two approaches to represent an agent's preferences under uncertainty-the mean-standard deviation 
approach and the expected utility maximization approach. Meyer (1987) identifies a sufficient condition that 
makes these two approaches consistent and confirms that it holds in many economic models. The restriction is 
that the choice set is composed of random variables that differ from one another only by location and scale 
parameters, i.e.. their cumulative distribution functions G, (.) andG,(.) have the property: 
G, (.r) = Go (or + /3r) with ^ >0 . When this restriction is satisfied, expected utility maximization can be 
reduced to a two-moment decision model. 
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• p is the market price of commodity com, which is assumed to be known at the 
beginning of the planting season to simplify the mathematics'^, y is the yield per acre of 
commodity com, which is a random variable with E(y) = y,Var(y) = . cis the 
production cost per acre. Then random profit (^1) from commodity com is given by: 
ttI = (py — c)Al 
• For HOC, consistent with our observation, the price is the market price of commodity 
com (p ) plus a premium (j^. Its yield per acre is (y ), where f is a random variable 
independent of y with mean e and variance At the current stage, with HOC still 
in its introductory stage, £ is assumed to be negative to reflect possible yield drag and 
<T^ denotes the additional yield variability of HOC compared to that of commodity com. 
We assume that the oil percentage of the HOC is not random and that the price premium 
is a fixed amount per bushel. In reality, the price premium schedule is a step function 
that depends on the stochastic oil content of the HOC. What is important here is that 
revenue from HOC is more variable than revenue from commodity com and for 
simplicity in exposition, we choose to model the uncertainty in yield only. Cost per acre 
We have implicitly assumed here and thereafter that the production of HOC won't affect the commodity 
com price. The assumption here is appropriate when the total output of HOC is very small relative to the total 
output of commodity com, as is the case in the early stages of HOC commercialization. We also assume the 
commodity com price is known to focus on the difference between HOC and conunodity com. Farmers can 
hedge the price risk by using the well-developed future and options market, but the optimal hedge rule gives 
only a partial hedge due to yield uncertainty. 
We take this simple approach rather than the heteroschedastic approach with y£ since there is no evidence 
for or against either of them and our main purpose to represent higher variability of HOC yield can be served 
by either of them. For the same reason, we assume y and £ are independent and there are no actual data 
supporting one way or the other. 
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is (c + s )  where s  represents the seed premium of HCXD over that of commodity com'^; 
s can take a negative value if there exists a seed subsidy. We adopt this structure to 
reflect the fact that HOC and commodity com production involves similar practices. 
Random profit from HOC is given by n2 and 
^  =  [ ( p  +  y X y  +  e )  —  c  —  S ] A 2  
• Profits are a random variable because yields are unknown at the time of decision 
making. However, in practice, j'is known before a production contract is signed. 
Moreover, given competition in the agricultural supply sector, input prices and thus costs 
per acre, i.e., ^and care known. 
• A grower's initial wealth plus income from other operations is w. 
Assumption 1: A representative grower maximizes his expected utility. 
Then, the decision model is: 
-ir 7t2)\s.t.A\.-¥ A2 = A,A1>0,A2>0 (1) 
M.A2 
r . . • r aA2 In this general case, the signs of r—are ambiguous. 
as 
4.2.2 A Model with CARA and Normality 
Assumption 2: A representative grower has a CARA (constant absolute risk 
aversion) utility function and normality can be assumed for the unknown variables'^. 
There are likely other additional costs associated with producing HOC such as segregation cost during 
production and after harvest. We ignore these for the simplicity of analysis, but including them won't change 
the qualitative results of the analysis. 
Normality of random variable satisfies the restriction identified in Meyer (1987) that makes a two-moment 
decision model consistent with an expected utility maximization model. This assumption simplifies our 
analysis. 
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Under assumption 2, Eiu(w + nl + Jt2)« £•(w + ;rl + 7tl) — -^AViaKw + Ttl + Ttl) 
where X>0 is the absolute risk aversion index. The bigger is X , the more risk averse is the 
grower. 
As long as nonsatiation is satisfied, the resource constraint A 1+A2=A will be binding 
and we can substitute A-A2 for Al. Therefore, under the additional CARA and normality 
assumptions, the grower's maximization problem becomes: 
max E(,w + 7i\-<r Ttl) — AVariw + ttI + Trl)s.t. Al > 0, A — Al > 0 (2) 
A2 1 
With the setup in 4.2.1, we have 
£(vv + ;rl + TTl) -^XVar{w + ;rl + Ttl) 
= w + pAy -cA + jA2}' + (p + Y )A1£ - 5A2 —-^[(pA + }A2)"<Ty +(p + Y ) '  A2'<JI\ 
For interior solutions (A2), which is the case that we are interested in, the first order 
condition is 
y>' + (p + j')f-j->l(/7A + ;A2)y«cr; -/l(p + k)-A2<t; =0 
Solving for A2, we obtain 
. ^  _ (p + r)g - +  Y Y  
^lr'^y-i-(P + r)'er;i 
and Al< A (3) 
A2 = Aif A2> A 
The second order sufficient condition is - ^y'(Ty — A(p + y)'(T^ ^ 0, which is 
always satisfied for > 0. 
See Appendix 2 for details. 
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A couple of notes are in order: 
• Yy-^{p + Y)£-s = E[{p + /)(>' + f) - c - 5 - (py - c)] which is the expected gain per 
acre from growing HOC rather than commodity com; and 
+ (p + Y)'^l = ^ [(P + y)(y + £)-c-s-(py -c)]which is the increase in 
variability in profit from growing HOC compared to commodity com. Therefore, A2 (the 
acreage allocated to HOC) is positively related to risk adjusted expected gain and 
negatively related to the associated increase in variability. 
(p -f- y)€ + yy — 5 
• A2=A when X is small enough. Specifically, if A < —i 7-—^—; ;—ri > which 
A\pr^; + +(p + r)'o"; J 
is possible only when (p + y)£ + /y - ^ > 0 since A > 0. 
• A2>Q\f ?.<——— , I.e., y+ f+ -^- >^pA(T-OTy>^—=— 7. 
pAY<r; Y y + e-ApA(T-
• A2=0 when X is big enough for given (^,5), i.e., when a grower is very risk averse, 
because HOC is riskier relative to commodity com. 
• A2<0 if Y = 0 and no HOC will be grown under our current assumptions of f < 0 and 
>0. 
• Examining (3) makes clear that the following results hold when A2>0, i.e., when HOC is 
^A2 dA2 dA2 dA2 dAl dA2 dA2 dAH ig grown, —=->0,—=^>0,-—<0,-—<0,—^<0,—^<0,—— <0,—— <0 , and 
dy de oA dp da'. da~ dA ds 
Let D = ^ f / ' C T y  + ( p  +  and = (p + /)£ - s -  k p A Y O ' y  + Yy • then D > 0 and 
3A2 V 3A2 "" — N — 
A ^ > O f o r  A 2 > 0 a n d  / l > 0 .  ^  = - i - > 0 .  —  =  ;  ^ < 0  e t c . .  
d y  D  d X  D -
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for commodity com, when A1 > 0, 
<?A1 - ^A1 _ ^A1  ^ dAl JAi „ tPAl <?A1 dAl 
-=- < 0,-^ < 0,— > 0,— > 0,-^ > 0,-^ > 0,— > 0,— > Obecause (Py a£ M dp da' a(T' aA as 
Al = A-A2. 
dA2 
• The sign of is not obvious without more assumptions (see Appendix 2). 
d y  
4.2.3 Properties of Acreage Decisions under CARA Utility Maximization 
The empirical implications of the expected CARA utility maximization are 
summarized as the following'^. 
• First, given that HOC has higher yield variability, the less risk averse growers are more 
likely to adopt the new product. For those who choose to produce some HOC, the 
acreage allocated to HOC increases as a grower becomes less risk averse 
^<Oif  A2>o\  
• Second, if the expected yield of HOC is less than that of commodity com, then no cash 
growers will grow it without a guaranteed positive price premium above the market 
price^°. For a given risk attitude, a certain price premium is necessary to entice the 
grower to plant some HOC. This minimum price premium increases with the degree of 
risk aversion. 
CARA implies a zero wealth effect, which is probably reasonable given the similarity in returns for HOC 
and commodity com. 
^ There may be a greater implicit price premium for livestock producers compared with cash growers who 
must share the added value with others in the value chain. 
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Third, the acreage devoted to HOC increases with £ and decreases with and (tI 
'dA2 ^ d!A2 ^ dA2 ^ 
-=-> 0,—^ < 0,—^ < 0 
de d(T- da; . The higher its yield and the smaller its variability, the 
more attractive is HOC. 
Fourth, a higher y , a lower p , or a lower A  induces a higher acreage of HOC 
^ dA2 ^ dAl ^ dA2 ^ 
^>0 ,—-<0 ,——<0 
dy 3A 
This is because y magnifies the positive effect of y, which 
is conducive to HOC; p magnifies the negative effect of the yield drag, and A 
magnifies the negative effect of y - increasing the variability of household's income, 
which is not favorable to HOC, certis paribus. Holding other things constant, a higher 
y means a higher premium is paid for each acre of land, and higher p means the 
premium has less weight. 
Fifth, acreage of HOC decreases with j since s represents higher production cost 
f—<o l -
Finally, the effect of y on A1 is ambiguous due to its the two-folded impacts on the 
desirability of HOC. It increases the income of grower but at the cost of increasing its 
variability. The balance of these two effects should give us the optimal value of y. 
Nevertheless, under quite general conditions, A2 will increase with y as long as HOC is 
planted at all. In that range of parameters, the positive effect of y outweighs the negative 
one. 
In general, the total volume of HOC produced is 
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r = A2(r,s,e,cr;)(y + €) = Y (y, s, £,cr;). 
Assumption 3: Aggregate behavior can be represented by a representative grower 
making decisions according to (2). 
The total HOC output (K) then can be specified given what we have derived above, 
i.e., Y = A2iY,s,€,(T;){y¥ e) = Y{Y^s,e,CTl) with —<0,^>0,^^<0. And—>0 if 
OS de a<J' dy 
dAP 
—^ > 0 which holds under certain conditions (See Appendix 2). 
ay 
dY Assumption 4: The conditions hold such that —— > 0 for the rest of analysis, which 
is consistent with empirical evidence. 
A price premium in terms of a fixed amount per bushel above the market price as we 
use here is used for HOC and almost all the other specialty grain, although a price premium 
in terms of percentage increase of market price could be an option too. However, if the latter 
is used, the results won't change. 
4.3 Determination of the Price Premium for HOC 
4.3.1 Value to End-users 
4.3.1.1 Experimental Data 
HOC is targeted at the animal feed industry in which com is a major ingredient. 
Many studies have been done to determine its value for end-users. According to Optimum's 
website viewed in May 1998, one of these studies is based on Midwest swine trials between 
Jan. 1994 and Dec. 1996. In the experiment, two diets (Optimum HOC/ typical com) which 
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were formulated to be iso-caloric, were fed to separated groups of hogs. Ingredient and hog 
prices were based on a lO-year average, with com valued at $2.50/bu. Optimum HOC was 
calculated to be worth an additional $0.48 per bushel"'. Another study conducted by DuPont 
sponsored researchers shows that HOC can effectively be used as a superior substitute for 
typical com in feedlot rations. A diet in which HOC was substituted for typical com on a 
weight basis in a diet that was previously optimized for typical com produced a 4.5% 
increase in maintenance and gain energy. 
4.3.1.2 Two Measurements 
The experiments mentioned above give two measurements of the value of HOC 
relative to typical com. One is to formulate the diet with HOC to have the same energy level 
of an optimized typical com diet. The difference in diet cost then is the added value of HOC. 
Alternatively, one can compare the costs of optimized diets that produce the same weight 
gain in animals. The second method is to substitute HOC for typical com in an optimal 
typical com diet on a weight basis. The extra gain of the animal then is attributed to HOC. 
A characteristics approach: Measurement 1 bases the value of HOC on its close 
substitutes such as typical com and fat, and it is essentially determined by their prices. This 
is in the spirit of characteristic approach to consumer theory, "...goods possess, or give rise 
to, multiple characteristics in fixed proportions and that it is these characteristics, not goods 
themselves, on which the consumer's preferences are exercised." (Lancaster, Kelvin J.) In 
the case of animal feed, it is the elements in the ingredients such as oil, starch and protein, 
that contribute energy to the productivity of animals. Thus those elements can be valued. 
•' The calculated added value depends greatly on the choices of the prices of the substitutes, which tend to vary 
greatly over time. 
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The value of an ingredient, composed of fixed proportions of multiple characteristics, should 
be the sum of the values of its characteristics. 
A value of marginal product approach : Measurement 2 bases the value of HOC on 
its marginal product, and thus on the price of the end product it is used to produce. The 
problem in this approach is that the ration with HOC is not optimized. More value can be 
realized if rations are optimized because animal performance depends significantly on 
rations. The value obtained this way therefore serves as a lower bound on the value of HOC. 
Since measurement 1 is based on optimized rations, the value obtained there is an upper 
bound of the value of HOC. The average value of HOC in actual use might be somewhere in 
between these two, due to different practices of animal feeders. 
Another complication in deriving the value of HOC is that optimal rations for 
different animals are different, and there is also a life cycle effect which may divide the 
animal life into 4-8 phases when different nutritional needs exist. This factor could 
potentially lead to different results for the experiments carried out by Dupont researchers. 
Measurement 2 is also subject to this limitation when values of marginal products are not 
equalized for an input across different uses. 
Theoretically, competition and free entry and free exit in all industries should drive 
the value of marginal product of an input to be equal across all uses, and value of the input 
to be equal to the value of its marginal product. Such is also true for a characteristic used as 
an input, which means that measurements I and 2 would give the same results under some 
ideal conditions. 
A characteristic approach is preferred to measure the value of HOC. The animal 
ingredients market is fairly competitive. Feeders optimize rations under the guidance of 
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nutritionists to minimize their cost per unit gain. It is easier and more reasonable to evaluate 
HOC on the basis of its characteristics relative to those of its close substitutes readily 
available on the market. 
Using data on typical com, fat and other animal feed ingredients, a hedonic model 
can be used to estimate the prices of HCXH's key elements- oil, starch and protein. The added 
value of HOC relative to typical commodity com can be calculated similarly. This value is 
not fixed over time; it varies with the prices of commodity com and other substitutes, which 
vary with changing market conditions. In particular, as the percentage of HOC in the feed 
market rises, the total supply of HOC com will affect the prices of commodity com and the 
price of fat. In such a situation, one cannot regard P as fixed. 
4.3.2 The Price Premium Charged to Processors/End-users 
Consider the price premium that can be charged to the end users: Let P be the added 
value of HOC, which is competitively determined by the prices of its substitutes. P could be 
estimated using a hedonic model as suggested above. However, the price premium denoted 
as 3 that the grain marketer can charge its customers will depend on the HOC market itself-
the number and relative sizes of customers. In a perfectly competitive world, without 
complications like relationship-specific investments, P will be the same as the added value 
of HOC {P) obtained above, assuming the grain marketer has all the bargaining power. 
When customers are large, P will depend on the relative bargaining power of the parties 
involved. When customers are small, the grain marketer will have all the bargaining power, 
and can maximize its gain subject to the participation constraints of its customers. 
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4.3.2.1 A Special Case-the Grain Marketer Has All the Bargaining Power 
Assume in this section that all HOC for export is marketed through Continental, as 
was the case during the period 1996-1998. Continental's overseas customers were spread 
over Asian and Latin American, and are small relative to Continental. Each customer's 
purchasing volume is small relative to the total marketed volume(K), and total marketing 
cost does not change significantly for different combinations of customers. The HOC 
business is constrained primarily at the production stage, and demand will be perfectly 
elastic for HOC at the price with appropriate marketing effort. Given these conditions. 
Continental has all the bargaining power, and it maximizes the price premium it charges (>3) 
subject to the participation constraint of processors. 
The setup is given as the following: 
• Let p'' be processors' selling price of processed commodity com. They can charge a 
price premium equal to its added value P for processed HOC. p'' is competitively 
determined. 
• Commodity com and HOC are essential inputs (denoted as x). A processor's output (y) 
i s  n o r m a l l y  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o . v .  W e  w i l l  i g n o r e  w e i g h t  l o s s  i n  p r o c e s s i n g  a n d  t h e n  y  =  x .  
• A processor pays price p  per unit to obtain the quantity of commodity com x, and p  is 
competitively determined by market. Let be the fixed cost associated with processing 
commodity com and VC^(x) be the variable cost of processing amount .r of commodity 
com. Then, with commodity com, a processor's profit is 
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=0,P  =  0 , f ^ )  =  max p ' ' x -  px  -  f ^ ~  VC ^  (jc) where the subscript c denotes 
commodity com. 
• With HOC, a processor pays a price of {p - \ -  0 )  for each unit, and charges a premium of 
P in addition io p'' for each unit of processed HOC. Let be the fixed cost and 
VC^(.r), the variable cost of processing HOC. Then, the processor's profit is 
KH =  - (p +  P ) x- f „ -  v c „ ( x )  where the subscript 
H denotes HOC. 
For each processor who purchases the product from Continental, Continental solves 
the following problem: 
max/? 
The idea is for Continental to charge as large of a premium as is possible subject to 
the constraint that a processor chooses to buy HOC. Solving the problem will give the price 
premium , and it is determined by (>?, ,  f  ^ ) =  (0,0, ). The processor will be 
just indifferent between using HOC and commodity com, and Continental obtains the 
maximum premium for HOC. 
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From (0,0, y ), we obtain 
n' ,sp-p ' ' f  j -n ' ,  (0 ,0 ,  f  ) = 0 which gives the comparative statics results: 
^  =  m.. > O a n d ^  
"N /I _  n  y  /^* ^ -v 
dp' 
<0 
a<(>g,^ ,/„) 
dp' 
P' increases with P and decreases with f„ . The more valuable HOC is to end-
users, the higher premium Continental can charge its customers. Higher costs to process 
HOC reduces the premium that a processor is willing to pay. In fact, when the cost of 
processing HOC is high enough, the added value of HOC will not be able to cover those 
costs, and HOC will not be used at all. 
We expect >9 to vary across customers and countries and so the optimal P' will 
typically vary accordingly as well. We take the average of P' for the analysis in the next 
section. 
4.4 Analysis of the Strategic Partnership between Dupont and Continental 
In early 1996 when the commercialization of HOC was in its infancy, Dupont 
teamed up with Continental Grain to market HOC overseas. The essential factors in 
realizing the value of HOC are the technology and identity-preserved marketing. Dupont is 
the owner of the technological innovation and Continental is one of the biggest global grain-
marketing firms. The success of HOC calls for the combination of the technology of Dupont 
^ They are independent of (0,0, ) since ) is not dependent on P ' ,  P  and . 
Grain 
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and the marketing expertise of Continental. The bottleneck is that the small volume of HOC 
produced makes marketing through the conventional marketing channel very expensive. 
Lack of an assured marketing channel and a guaranteed price premium will limit or even 
prevent cash growers from producing HOC. Thus a grain firm is indispensable. Indeed, 
before Dupont formed alliances with Continental, its experiences with HOC were 
unsuccessful, since producers were faced with significantly lower yields and an inadequate 
market structure to effectively handle the crop (Jones, 1998). 
4.4.1 A Model without Private Investment 
Cooperation between these two firms should produce more benefit for them than an 
arm's length market relationship. One possible source of gain is that if they share the total 
surplus from HOC marketing, then DuPont can capture some of the return from marketing 
HOC, which provides DuPont with more incentive to create a market for HOC. 
As shown in Section 4.2, two variables that are potentially controllable, the seed premium 
that a grower is charged (5) and the price premium that a grower receives (y), affect his 
acreage decisions. 
Pioneer and Monsanto control almost half of the total com seed market in Northern 
America. Since Monsanto didn't license HOC technology from DuPont, Pioneer is the 
market leader in the HOC seed business with other firms supplying HOC seeds being small, 
therefore, it can effectively set the price premium for HOC seeds subject to competition 
from other com seed varieties. With its equity stake in Pioneer, Dupont can actually control 
the price premium for HOC seeds (^) directly through Pioneer, and it will get a fee r(s) for 
every acre of HOC planted, we call this fee, a license fee in general. This license fee will be 
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positively related to the seed premium, i.e., [ > 0 | and in fact may be equal to it in 
i j 
which case = 1. If a grain companies market HOC independently, the price premium 
as 
for HOC given to the growers ( y )  will be determined solely by the grain company. 
The seed premium (5) affects not only the licensing income, but also the gain in the 
marketing stage since the current constraint is mainly that not enough volume is produced 
and economies of scale can not be achieved in the marketing channel and total HOC 
fdv  production decreases with increasing j < 0 
I as 
\ 
. If Dupont can't get part of the surplus 
from marketing HOC, it will ignore the impact of s on the gain in the marketing stage. At 
the beginning stage, when there is relationship specific cost such as dedicated assets 
associated with the project, a grain firm without a say on the seed price might find itself 
vulnerable in the market. Similarly, the price premium (y) will affect not only the gain in 
the marketing stage, but the licensing income as well because that the growers' acreage 
f dY  decisions are dependent on y 
d y  
If yis determined independently by the grain 
company, it will not take the second impact into consideration. From a game theoretic point 
of view, ^and s affect not only the distribution of the available surplus to relevant agents, 
but also the size of joint surplus. In fact, the cooperatively detennined yand s will 
maximize the joint surplus, generating a bigger pie than the noncooperatively determined 
variables. Total surplus will be divided through bargaining. In particular, we would expect 
higher j'and lower s under cooperation, which can be illustrated by the following model. 
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Proposition 1: Price premiums paid to growers are higher and seed premiums 
charged are lower when they are jointly determined to maximize the joint surplus than 
otherwise. 
• Assume for a given technology, HOC is sold to processors/end-users at a premium of P 
per bushel above the conmiodity price p . As stated before, P is the average of fi's that 
are determined in section 4.3.2; therefore, it is not a choice variable in this stage of 
decision-making. The commodity com price p is competitively determined and thus 
given as well^. 
^is)  
• Let the total seed license fee be r = r(s)A2(y, s) with —> 0 where s is the seed 
as 
premium that a seed firm charges for HOC seeds. 
• To market HOC, some fixed relationship-specific cost F has to be incurred. 
• The total amount of HOC produced is K = Al{y, s)(y + e) with E(y) = y and 
E(£) = e (see section 4.2 for more detailed definitions). 
• The variable marketing cost of moving grain of amount Y from Continental to the 
processors/end-users is VCiV) with > 0 and^ ^' 
• Dupont and Continental, being large conglomerates, are assumed to be risk neutral. 
The joint profit or the total surplus to the alliance between DuPont and Continental is 
given by 
^ See footnote 12 on P. 32. If the total output of HOC were large enough, the price of HOC and commodity 
com would be determined endogenously as two competing differentiated products. 
The setup of total surplus in this form is dependent on the fact that there is not enough production of HOC at 
this stage to affect the price of commodity com. 
49 
ts  =  E[r i s ) A2 iY , s )  +  {p^ p)y- ip  + Y )y  -  f -vc(x) ]  
=  E[r{ s )A2 iY ,  s )  +  {P -  Y ) mY ,  s ) i y ^e ) -F -  KC( A2(y, s ) ( y  +  e ) ) ]  
=  r ( s )A2 iY ,  s )  +  i ^ -  r )A2(y ,  s ) i y  +  £ ) -F -  E[V ^ C (  A2(y ,  s ) ( y  +  e ) ]  
Under cooperation, Dupont and Continental will choose ^and 5 to maximize 
expected total surplus (TS ) , i.e.. 
max 75 
(4) 
= max R(S)A2IY^ + y)A2(y ,  s ) ( y  +  £ ) - F -  £[V^C(  A 2 (x ,  s ) ( y  +  £• ) ]  
Joint surplus is thus made of license fees [(r(s)A2(y, 5)] and price premiums 
obtained from HOC users minus premiums paid to growers [(>9 — y)A2(y, s)iy + f)] mi nus 
the fixed and variable costs of marketing the HOC. 
Assume the second order sufficient conditions are satisfied. For interior solutions. 
the first order conditions are: 
Y : [r(5) +  ( f i - Y K y  +  £ ) ] ^  -  a2(y ,  s X y  + £) -e  
dy 
s :  [ r i s )  +  y)G + e)]^ + A2(y ,  5)-^ - e 
as  a s  
Denote the solutions to (5) as • 
dvc da2 
dy dy 
dVC dA2 
( y  +  £ )  = 0 
sy ds (y + £) 
(5) 25 
= 0 
These first order conditions are merely that the marginal benefit is equal to the 
marginal cost of changing the choice variables. Rearrange (5) and we will have: 
Y : [r(5) +  {P-Y ) {y^  e ) ^  = A l i y ,  f)  +  E 
ay 
dVC dA2 
dy  ^(y + f) (5-A) 
„ dAH dAl 
We can take —r— ,  — o u t  o f  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  f u n c t i o n  b e c a u s e  A2 is independent of variables y and e. 
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s :  A2 i y , s ) ^ ^ ^  -  E  dvcda2, (y + £) = -[r(5) ^ {P-Y)iy^ e)]^ (5-B) 
as  dY  d s  
The left side of (5-A) is the increase of the license fee and the gain from marketing 
HOC; the right side is the marginal cost associated with the change of ^ ^  the first term is the 
increase in premium paid to growers, and the second term is the increase in marketing cost. 
Similarly, on the left side of (5-B), the first term is the increase of the license fee due to 
higher seed premium s, and the second term is the reduction in marketing cost due to the 
smaller volume induced by higher seed premium. On the left side is the loss arising from the 
lost seed license fee and the lost gain from marketing HOC due to less acreage allocated to 
produce HOC. 
Without cooperation. Continental will choose y to maximize its profit from selling 
HOC and Dupont chooses s to maxinuze its license fee. Their decisions are respectively. 
Continental: maxE[(y9->')K-F-VC(K)] (6-C) 
Y 
DuPont: max r(^)A2(j',5) (6-D) 
s 
Assume that the second order sufficient conditions for both (6-C) and (6-D) are 
satisfied. For interior solutions, their first order conditions are respectively. 
y- \p-  r ) (y+ f )]^ - A2(r, 5)(3'+f) - £ 
07 
= 0 (7-C) 
^ X <^(.y) « 
s  :  r { s ) -— +A2 iy , s )—— = 0 (7-D) 
OT as  
Solve (7-C) and (7-D) jointly, and denote the solutions as ( y ,  s ) .  
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To compare {y ' ,s ' ) withi y , s ) ,  we evaluate (5) at {y , s )  using the first order 
conditions of (7-C) and (7-D). By doing so we obtain. 
Y  : [r(5) + {P-Y ) {y  +  f )]^ - A2{y ,  ?)(y + f)  -  £  dy 
= +  ( / ?  -  Y){y  + f )^ - A2(f, s ) { y ^ e ) -E  
dy  [  d y  
=  r ( s ) - z—>0  
dVC dAl 
dY  dy  
dVC dA2  
dV  dy  
( y -h£ )  
( y  +  £ )  
dy 
: [r(?) + (^ - r)(3' + 
as  
dvc {P- y ) i y  +  £ ) - E  
dY  
(y + £) dA2 
ds  
d s  
< 0  
dvc dA2 
dY  d s  
( y  +  £ )  
(8-A) 26 
(8-B) 27 
To simplify notations, let 
6  =  T S (y , s )  =  E[r ( s )A2 (y , s )  +  ( p  +  f i )Y - ip + y)Y - F - VC(Y)], then (5) becomes: 
dA2 (y? -  y) ( y  +  e )— A2(f, JXy + £) - E 
dy  
dAl ^ 
to (7-C), and —i— > 0. 
3VC dAl 
dY  dy  
i y  +  £ )  = 0 according 
dy  
From (7-D) we have at (/, s ) , r(?)—-—I- A2iy ,  = 0. From (7-C) we get, 
OT ds  
[ ( / ?  - y ) ( y  +  f )]^ - A2(f, s ) ( y  +  £ ) -E  
dy 
Rearrange the terms and we will get at {y, ?) , 
dvc dAl 
dY  dy  
( y + f )  = 0 
{ P-y ) {y  +  £ ) -E  
dAl 
dvc 
and since 
dAl 
dy  
dY  
> 0, we will have 
dA2 
dy  
{P -y ) {y  +  £ ) -E  
= A2(f,?)(y + f)>0 
dvc 
dy (y + f) > 0. This result, together 
with—-— < 0 and (7-D), will make (8-B) hold. 
ds  
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y  :0  ( y , s )  =  0  
(5') j:  0^ (y , s )  =  O 
The second order condition is: H  =  
e_ 
osy ^ss 
is negative definite, which gives: 
0„<O, 0,. 0 
0. 
0. 
rr 
Using (5') and the Implicit Function Theorem, we obtain. 
ds  e,=o 
_ 0SS ^ 
0sy ' ds 
0 ys 
0^=0 0 r r  
(8-A) and(8-B) give >Oand0j_. <0. 
dy  
If 0J5 < 0 (see Appendix 2-C for the sign of 0y^), then 0. ___ss 
0,=o 0sr 
< 0 because 
dy  0^^ < 0 by the second order conditions. Similarly, —^ 
ds  
= —— < 0 because 
0^=0 0n 
0yy < 0. Given these negative slopes, we can draw the graph in Figure 3-A. 
In Figure 3-A, the segment AB gives us the combination of ( y , s )  that satisfies the 
first order condition for s : 0^(y,s) = 0. The area to the right of AB gives (y,s) such that 
0s(/'^) < 0since < 0, and for those (y,s) that lie below AB, 0^(y,s)>0. Similarly, 
segment CD gives (y,s) such that the first order condition y :0y(y,s) = Ois satisfied; for 
those above CD, 0j, (y, s)<0; and for those lying below CD, 0y (y, s)>0. Therefore, we 
have y <y',s > s' and Proposition 1 is proved for the case with^j, < 0. For the case when 
0^  >0 ,  which is more likely, we have the graph in Figure 3-B. 
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=0 
s 
(y,s) lies in the shaded area. 
Figure 3-A: A Graphic Proof of the Result in 4.4.1 (0^ < 0) 
6t=0 
s F 
(y,s) lies in the shaded area. 
Figure 3-B: A Graphic Proof of the Result in 4.4.1 (0^ > 0) 
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As before, in Figure 3-B, the segment AB gives us the combination of (>', j) that 
satisfies the first order condition for s: 0^ iy, j) = 0. The area to the left of AB gives 
(/, 5) such that 6^ (y, s)>0 since < 0; and for those (y, s) that lie to the right of AB, 
( y ^  s )<0 .  Similarly, segment CD gives ( y ,  s )  such that the first order condition 
y :  6^  ( y , 5) = 0 is satisfied. For those (y, s) that lie to the right of CD, 0^ (y, s)>0, and for 
those to the left of CD, 0^ (y,s) <0. Therefore, (y,s) lies in the shaded area in Figure 3-B 
when 0^ >0. This gives (y < y' and s > 5*) in area EOF, (y < y' and s < ^ *) in area BOF, 
and ( y  >  y '  and ? > 5*) in area AOC. Only when ( y , s )  lies in area EOF, will Proposition 1 
hold. 
By the definition of maximization, total surplus 
(TS = E[r(s)A2(y,  s ) -h(p + P)Y-{p-^y)Y-F - VC{Y)\) is higher with iy', 5*) than 
with(f, j), which means that cooperation is preferable to pure open market transactions. 
This is similar to the result obtained from standard oligopoly models. The intuition is that 
when the decisions are carried out independently, neither party will take into account of the 
negative impact on the other party's profitability of its action. When the decisions are made 
cooperatively, the externalities are intemalized. 
As long as y and s  are contractible, which is reasonable in the case of HOC, 
cooperation can be achieved by contracting. 
4.4.2 A Model with Private Investments 
The private investment incentive is a second factor that can lead to gains in 
cooperation between Dupont and Continental. The previous model takes technology as 
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given, but it is more likely that continued research to improve HCX^'s performance and 
technical assistance to growers from Dupont will be important at the initial stage. These 
factors will most possibly influence K- the volume of HOC produced. Continental's private 
action affects marketing costs to a large degree. All theOse private investments are not 
contractible, because it would be very costly, if not impossible, for them to be verified by a 
third party due to uncertainty and unmeasurability of private efforts. 
Proposition 2: When private investments are not contractible, at least one firm and 
most possibly both firms will underinvest. 
• Denote Dupont's effort at R&D as /. Higher i  will lead to higher Y .  The cost of this effort 
to Dupont is c(/), and c(0) = 0,c (/) > 0,c (/) > 0 Vi,c (i = 0) » 0. 
• Denote Continental's actions to make marketing efficient as I .  Action / reduces VC(Y)  at 
a cost of C(/) to Continental. Assume C(0) = 0, C (/) > 0, C (/) > 0 V/, C (/ = 0)» 0. 
• To simplify notation, write the license (or royalty) fee as r i s .Y )  as opposed 
tor = r(s)A2iy,s) used in section 4.4.1 . 
Total surplus of the project now is, 
TS  =  Ks ,  Y )  +  (p  +  P )n i ,  Y , s ) - { p - ^  y ) y ( i ,  y , s ) -F -  VC(y ,  / )  -  cO)  - C(/) 
= r(s, K) + (/9 - y)y(i, y,s)-F- VC(V, I) - c(i) - C(/) (9) 
= B( i ,  I , y , s ) -F -  c(/) - C(/) 
where r ( s ,  K) +  ( /?  -  y)Y ( i ,  y , s )  -  VCiY ,  I )  =  B( i J , y ,  s )  
p , the commodity price, is competitively given; is detennined in a previous stage 
as shown in section 4.2.2. Therefore, the choice variables here are (i, /, y ,  s ) . The decisions 
are carried out in four stages. First, the two parties choose private actions (i, /); second. 
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they negotiate on the values of (/, 5). After that, production contracts are signed with 
growers and total surplus is realized. Finally, they bargain over the gain given their outside 
options (see Figure 4). 
i i m  e  
C h o o s e  I  /  
s e p a r a t e l y  
N  e  g  o  t i  a  t c  
on (y .s  )  C o n t r a c t  w  i t h  g r o w e r s  a n d  
p r o c e s s o r s  a n d  
r c  a  l i z e  t h e  t o  t a  I  
s u r p l u s  
B  a  r g  a  i  n  
o v e r  t h e  
g a i n  o v e r  
o u t s i d e  
o p t i o n s  
Figure 4: The Timing of Events in the Partnership with Private Investment 
Assumption: Assume Nash bargaining (with equal bargaining power)"^. The outside 
option for Continental is Br, which is its benefit without cooperation with Dupont. Dup)ont 
can find an alternative partner, we assume its outside option to be . 
This assumption has been frequently used in property rights h'terature. for example, in Hart (1995) Chapter 2. 
However, the bargaining powers of DuPont and Continental may not be so balanced to give a 50:50 split of ex 
post surplus. Continental may face competition from other grain companies, which will reduce its bargaining 
power. However, as long as there is relationship-specific investment and Continental is the most efficient 
partner, it will get a positive share of the ex post surplus. In the meantime. Bi/ serves as a gauge of 
competition as well. Higher firf indicates more intensive competition. 
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The bargaining solution with equal bargaining power will lead to an even division of 
the surplus. The surplus for each firm is. 
Continental: 
Be [r(5, y ) + r )YU,  Y , S ) -VC{Y ,n - 'Bc -Bd]=^  B( i ,  I )+^Bc - ^B^  (lO-C) 
DuPont: 
Bh+^[r ( , s ,Y )  +{p -Y )Y{ i ,Y  VO X,  n -Be -Bd]=^  f l (i,  I ) Be+^ BH (lO-D) 
Subtracting the costs, the payoffs are respectively: 
Continental: 
.  +1[r i s ,Y )  +  i f i -  Y ) Y i i ,  Y , s )  -  VC (Y ,  I ) -Be -B^] -CU)  ~  F  
=  -B { i , I )  +  -Br - -Bd  -C( I ) -F  9 9 9 
DuPont. 
(H-C) 
B ,+^  [r(5, Y)  +  ( / 3 -  r )Y ( i ,  Y^  s )  -  VC(Y , I )  -Be -  B , ] - c ( i )  
=  ^ b i i , i ) -^be- \b , -c i i )  
2 2 2 
(11-D) 
Under the specified timing structure, the second stage decision (determining y and s )  
is the same as that of (4). We expect (j', s) to be determined optimally for given actions 
(/, I). Even if the timing structure is different, as long as renegotiations are allowed, the 
r e s u l t  w i l l  b e  t h e  s a m e .  T h e  f i r s t  s t a g e  d e c i s i o n  p r o b l e m  b e c o m e s  o n e  o f  c h o o s i n g  ( / ,  I ) ,  
where ()', 5) are functions of (t, /). 
58 
The first best levels of(i*,/*) are obtained by maximizing the total 
surplus TS = 5(i, I)-F — c(i) — C(/) in equation (9) which is the same as the sum of the two 
individual payoffs in (11-C) and (11-D). The first order conditions for interior solutions are; 
£ (12) 
d l  d l  
However, the two firms will maximize their individual payoffs, denote the result as 
(/,/). And the first order conditions for interior solutions are respectively: 
(13-D) 
2 d i  d i  
= 0 (13-C) 
2  d l  d l  
Equations in (12) and (13) differ because when there is joint maximization, levels of 
investments (i and I) are coordinated to achieve the highest joint surplus. If the investment 
variables i and / are chosen independently to maximized individual payoffs, there will be no 
coordination of the levels of i and /, and total surplus must be less than the one that is 
obtained when both variables are chosen simultaneously. 
Assume that the second order sufficient conditions are satisfied. Solving (13-C) and 
(13-D) jointly will give ( i ,T ) .  Compare (13-C&D) with (12), with the assumption that 
/) ^ Q > 0, we will have i < i*, or 7 < / * or both when < 0(See 
d i  d l  
Appendix 2-D and Figure 5-A. The proof is similar to that for Proposition 1 in section 
4.4.1). At least one and possibly both firms will underinvest in noncontractible efforts. 
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When (p^i = > 0, i.e., the private investments of DuPont and Continental are 
complementary inputs, we will have i < i* and I < /'(see Figure 5-B), i.e., both firms 
underinvest. This second scenario holds when the marginal productivity of one party 
increases with the level of the other party's investment, which is more likely in this project. 
T h e  u n d e r i n v e s t m e n t s  h a p p e n  e v e n  i f  ( j ' , 5 ) a r e  c o n t r a c t i b l e ,  b e c a u s e  f o r  e v e r y  f i x e d  ( x , s ) ,  
at least one and possibly two firms will underinvest. The underinvestment problem arises 
from the fact that each party gets less than the full benefit of their private effort. In this case, 
they get only half of it (13-C. 13-D). 
/ 
(/ , / ) lies in the shaded area. 
Figure 5-A: A Graphic Proof of the Result in 4.4.2 = B^, < 0) 
60 
I 
I  
( i  , 1 )  lies in the shaded area. 
Figure 5-B: A Graphic Proof of the Result in 4.4.2 (^,y = > 0) 
4.4.3 An Extension with Variable Outside Options 
We have assumed for simplicity in section 4.4.2 that the outside options for DuPont 
and Continental are fixed. A closer examination shows that they might very well depend on 
the private investments of the firms. DuPont's investment in the continuous improvement of 
HOC's performance and technical assistance to growers will increase the value of the 
project whichever the partner it chooses; the second best partner will also benefit had it been 
choosen. Continental's private effort at cost control and marketing will improve its prospect 
without participating in the HOC value chain too. The question that entails then is: how will 
this affect the two firms' incentives to make private investments? However, the relative 
magnitude of private investments' effects on the first best alliances and on the outside 
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options will differ. The marginal contributions of the private investments to the alliances 
will be generally higher than to the second best partners. 
Let Bdi i ) , Bc(/)be the outside options of DuPont and Continental respectively, 
then the payoffs after bargaining are: 
Continental: — /) + — Bc{ I )  — — Bd i i )  — C(/) - F 
2 2 2 
DuPont: - fl(/, /) - - flc(/) + -'Bdii) - c(/) 
2 2 2 
The first order conditions for interior solutions to their decisions are: 
• 2 a/ 2 _a/ 3/ 
.  ydbj i j )  ^ idbdj i )  3C(/)_Q 
2  d i  2  d i  
Denote the solution to (14) as (/, /). 
Assume that the value of outside options increase with the private investment level, 
i.e., DuPont and Continental will benefit from their private investment and that benefit is 
positively related to the level of that investment even if they don't form an alliance. Then, 
evaluating (14) at (/, /) gives: 
. A dB{iJ) I dBdji) 3c(0 
2 di 2 di di 
> 0  
u .T )  
i .  a^b{ i , i )  ^ idbcj l )  dcd) 
2 dl 2 dl dl 
> 0  
(i.T) 
As long as the private investments are to a certain degree relationship 
specificf > iMi) and MJl > 1 di di dl dl 
\ 
, evaluating (14) at (/*,/') will give: 
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.  XdBd i i )  a c ( i ) ,  
'  " ( t — — ' • " T —  2 di  2 di di 
< 0  
U'J') 
1 dB( i , n  I dBc ( I )  d C j l )  
2 0/ 2 dl 31 
<0 
«*./•) 
Using the same method as in Appendix 2.D, we get the Figure 6-A when B^, < 0, and 
Figure 6-B when B^, > 0. 
Therefore, we will have / > /, and/or I <l , or both when B^, < 0. At lease one 
firm will invest more in private effort with variable outside options than with fixed outside 
options. When B^, >0, i > i and I <I , and both firms invest more with certainty in 
private effort with variable outside options. Then, with very high probability, both private 
investment levels are higher with variable outside options than with fixed outside options. 
The implication here is that if both firms underinvest in uncontractible efforts with fixed 
outside options, efforts that positively affect the outside options can lessen the degree of 
underinvestment and partially solve the problem. 
Given that the marginal contributions of i, I  to the alliance are generally higher than 
the contribution of i, I to the outside options dBi i , I )  d Bd iO  ^  dB( i , I )  dBc{ I )  > — and —r > , we 
3i di dl dl 
will have / < /', and/or / < /', or both when B^, < 0. We will have i <i < /* and 
I < I < r unambiguously when B^, > 0. Therefore, both firms will still likely underinvest 
under (14), albeit to a lesser degree. 
Noticeably, if ® 
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1 dBjU) ^ 1 dBcjl) dCU) 
^ 1 dBdji) dc(i) 
( I ,  /  )  l i e  i n  t h e  s h a d e d  a r e a  B O D  a n d  
(/*,/*) lie in the shaded area AOC. 
Figure 6-A: A Graphic Proof of the Result in 4.4.3 ( fl,, < 0) 
I8fl0\/) ^ I9&(/) dCin 
IdBdit) dc(i) 
=0 
(f, 7) lie in the shaded area BOD and 
(/*,/*) lie in the shaded area AOC. 
Figure 6-B: A Graphic Proof of Result in 4.4.3 ( > 0) 
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• 1 3g(/,/) ^ 1 dBd{ i )  d c (0  
2  d i  2  d i  d i  
> 0  
(T.T) 
l dB ( i , / )  I dBcU)  ac(/) 
2 3/ 2 3/ 3/ 
= 0 
(T.T) 
and (/,/) will lie on the segment OB in Figure 6-A, which gives: i  >  i  and I  <  I  
dBdii) ^ ^ If —-^ = 0, then 
d i  
.  I  d B ( i , / )  ^ I  dB d ( i )  dc ( i )  
' 2 di "^2 3/ 3/ 
= 0 
O J )  
I. + 1 ^BcU) _ 3C(/) 
2 3/ 2 3/ 3/ 
> 0  
(T.T) 
and (i, /) will lie on the segment DO in Figure 6, which gives i < i  and I  >  I  .  
In other words, the existence of a positive effect of one party's private investment on 
its outside option in the absence of another will alleviate its own underinvestment problem 
but aggravate that of the other party when B^, < 0. If DuPont's outside option is more 
affected by its own private investment and the effect of Continental's private investment on 
its outside option is minimal, then DuPont's incentive problem is less severe; and vice versa. 
In summary, fixed outside options for each firm will lead to underinvestment by one or both 
firms compared to the maximization of joint surplus, variable outside options or the ability 
of the firms to affect the payoffs to the outside options, will lessen this effect. In Figure 6-
A, the optimal solution with variable outside options just between the set of investment 
levels maximizing joint surplus (AOC) and those maximizing individual surplus with fixed 
options (BOD). 
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4.5 Comparison of Different Ownership Structures 
The socially optimal private efforts would be those that maximize the total surplus of 
the project, i.e., (/",/') that are defined by equations in (12). 
max TS = B{i ,  I )  —F -  c(/) — C(/) and the first order conditions are: 
t.i 
. abji, /) mi) 
^ ^ ( p )  
dl  dl  
The total surplus achieved in the first best is: TS" = Bii ' ,1 ' )  — F -c{ i ' ) -€{! ' )  
We have seen in the previous section that when DuPont and Continental are separate 
firms with equal bargaining power, the bargaining will lead to sharing of the total surplus of 
the project, and private efforts (i , / ) are defined by equations in (13). 
1 dS dc{i)  _  ^  
- ^ (13) 
^ ^ ( / ) _ Q  
'  2  dl  dl  
The total surplus resulting in the nonintegrated case is: 
TS" =B(iJ)-F-c( i ) -C(l)  
If one party has the full ownership of the project, it will have the full incentive to do 
private investment since it will enjoy the full benefit of its investment; while the other party, 
deprived of the right to enjoy the benefit of its private effort, will have no incentive to invest 
in unobservable private efforts. The minimum level of private effort by the employed party 
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will be the level of effort induced by the employees' ego, career concern and prospects of 
informal rewards^'. We can normalize this minimum level of effort as 0. 
The decision-makings in the presence of integration are respectively: 
Integration by Continental: i=0 and I is chosen to maximize 
rS = B(i = 0, I,Y,S)-F-C{I) 
And first order condition is: 
^(/ = 0,/) ^(/)_ Q  
dl  dl  
Integration by Dupont: /=0 and i is chosen to maximize 
TS = BU^O,i , Y , s ) - F - c { i )  
And first order condition is: 
dBU = 0,i) dc{i) 
a di 
We say one party's private investment is not important if its marginal impact on the 
total surplus is approximately zero for any positive level of that investment^®. And the fact 
that there is strictly positive cost associated with exerting any positive level of effort will 
make the optimal level of this party's investment to be the minimum level. This implies 
acquisition of the physical assets of a party whose private effort is not important won't affect 
the total surplus, in which case the optimal ownership structure will be determined by the 
other party's private investment. When the other party's private investment is important. 
This assumption is same as those made in Aghion & Tirole (1994). 
If the second order conditions are satisfied, i.e., ^ ^ < 0, then ^ == 0 will suffice. 
di' ai 
67 
integration by the other party is optimal. When both parties' private efforts are not 
important, optimal ownership structure will be determined by other factors. 
If Dupont's private investment is not important, then i' = 0. Integration by 
Continental won't affect the total surplus. If Continental's private is important, then the best 
ownership structure will be integration by Continental, and Dupont should sell the 
technology and technical services to Continental, if feasible. This is hardly the case since the 
biotechnology is in the rapidly innovating stage, while grain business is a relatively mature 
and stable business. We haven't seen any grain company that bought out a seed technology 
and used it exclusively. In fact, we have seen Cargill sell off its seed divisions and set up 
joint ventures with Monsanto. 
If Continental's private investment is not important, then /* = 0. Integration by 
DuPont will not affect the total surplus. It will be optimal for Dupont to integrate forward 
into the marketing stage. 
When /' » 0, /* » 0, i.e., private investments by both parties are important, non-
integration represented by (13) is the optimal ownership structure. Both parties' incentives 
to invest will be preserved to a certain extent, although not completely. This is a second best 
solution to the uncontractibility problem. All the conclusions above have implicitly assumed 
total surplus achieved by the specified ownership structure is larger than that of the outside 
option, namely TS> B +0= B . Otherwise, the best they can do is to undertake the 
alternatives. 
We have assumed that DuPont and Continental have equal bargaining power so far. 
However, if one party has all the bargaining power, the conclusions can differ. In fact, the 
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bargaining power can serve as a substitute for integration when one party doesn't contribute 
important private effort. For instance, when Continental's private effort is not important 
while that of DuPont is, if DuPont has all the bargaining power, it can extract all the surplus 
by paying a marketing fee to Continental. 
We can also argue that ownership structure evolves as technology and the nature of 
the project change over time, which is the norm of business life. The importance of private 
efforts changes as a new technology matures and a project is established to do repeated 
trades. The productivity of a party's private effort may increase or diminish over time, so 
will its control of the project. 
4.6 A Dynamic Model 
Dynamics may be a key factor in shaping the partnership between the seed 
technology provider and downstream firms. More value-enhanced grains are being 
developed and are expected to be introduced into the market in the near future (see Table 1 
and Table 2). This prospect will have a significant impact on decisions made today. 
Specifically, forward-looking agents will take the effect of present investments on the future 
gains into consideration. 
In the case of HOC, the current actions of DuPont and the grain handler can 
influence the future gains through several channels. One is the positive externality rising 
from learning- by- doing. One of the obstacles to commercialize HOC- a new product- is the 
lack of information and thus interests from growers and end-users. Efforts to provide 
assistance and information to growers and end-users will have a positive impact on the 
acceptance of new value-enhanced products. Evidence shows that lack of information is one 
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Table 4.1 Pipeline of Biotechnology Quality Traits in Major Crops 
Product Technology Developmental stage Value 
Com High lysine 
Low N fertilizer need 
Low Phytate 
Modified starch 
Phyto-manufacturing 
Pre-commercial 
R&D 
R&D 
I*re-commercial 
R&D 
Moderate to Low 
High 
Moderate 
Low 
Moderate 
Soybeans High oleic 
Improved protein 
High stearic 
Phyto-manufacturing 
Commercial 
Pre-commercial 
Pre-commercial 
R&D 
Moderate/high 
High 
Low 
Low 
Canola High laurate 
High oleic/low 
linoleic 
High saturates 
High erucid 
Phyto-manufacturing 
Pre-commercial 
Pre-commercial 
R&D 
Pre-commercial 
R&D 
Low 
High 
Low 
Low/moderate 
Low 
Source: Developed through personal interviews with leading biotechnology developers. 
Phyto-manufacturing, also Imown as molecular farming, involves production of substances at 
molecular levels (e.g., enzymes, piantibodies). 
Kalaitzandonakes, Nicholas, and Richard Maltsbarger, Biotechonology and Identity-Preserved 
Supply Chains, Choices, Fourth Quarter 1998, ppI6 Table I 
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Table 4.2 OPTIMUM Quality Grain's Product Pipeline 
Year Product 
Com 
1998 HOC+high oleic 
1999 HOC+high lysine 
2001 HOC+high lysine+high methionine 
Soybeans 
1997 High oleic 
2000 High lysine 
2001 High lysine+high oleic 
2001 High lysine+high methionine 
2002 High oleic+low saturate+high lysine, high 
methionine 
Source: OPTIMUM Quality Grains. 
factor influencing some growers in their decisions not to produce value-enhanced com. 
Growers having previous experience with one type of value-enhanced grain production are 
more likely to participate in programs involving the other types (U.S. Feed Grain Council, 
1998). A grower may improve production efficiency as he becomes more familiar with the 
new crop. A better-informed grower is more likely to try a new crop. Therefore, the grower 
base will be enlarged in the future value-enhanced grains. As for the end-users, they need to 
be convinced of the added value of value-enhanced grains to be willing to pay a premium 
for them. Lack of information was found to be a factor impeding the acceptance of value-
enhanced corns (U.S. Feed Grain Council, 1998). The end-users will learn more about the 
value of the new products in the process of using them, and in the meantime, leam how to 
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use them more efficiently by optimizing feed rations, etc. So marketing efforts today also 
help create a customer base for the future. The marketing firms- DuPont, Continental, ADM 
and ConAgra, will leam over time and become more efficient in disseminating information, 
which will make their future efforts more effective and cost efficient. 
Another reason for improved results over time in commercializing value-enhanced 
products is specific to the incumbents of an on-going relationship, relationship-specific 
human capital. Specialty grains require close coordination along the supply chain, and 
DuPont formed an alliance with Continental to create a market for HOC. To set up and 
coordinate a contractual relationship requires investment in not only tangible assets such as 
those used in communication, but more importantly in human capital. The human personnel 
involved develop a particular knowledge about the relationship, which facilitates the 
carrying out of the coordination. This human capital is specific to the relationship and 
valuable only within the relationship. Its existence gives the incumbent firms an advantage 
over potential partners. In fact, when new products are marketed. Continental, having 
invested in both physical and human assets, may have a first mover advantages over its 
rivals. The physical assets could be communication equipment specific to the relationship, 
and/or facilities customized to handle the relatively small volume of specialty grain in an 
identity-preserved way. However, there is always a possibility that a potential competitor 
may overtake an incumbent by leapfrogging on managerial expertise and technology. 
The dynamic factor will inevitably affect the investment incentives and participation 
decisions in the partnership. The benefit expected in the future will provide additional 
incentive to invest today and makes the relationship more profitable than otherwise. The 
ideas are formalized below. 
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4.6.1 A Simplified Model 
The set up 
• Assume there are two periods, t=0, and t=l. At t=0, HOC is the product. At t=l, a 
different new value-enhanced product will be introduced to the market. 
• Time preference parameter is p. 
• To simplify, assume that there is no active competition with Continental in either period 
and DuPont and Continental remain partners in the second period. In both periods, the 
outside options of both firms are fixed. The outside options at t=0 are the same as before, 
while those at t=l denoted as Bel ,  Bd\^^  for Continental and DuPont. 
• To embody the effect of current investment on the future gains, total surplus TSl  at t=I 
is denoted as a function of investments' level at t=0, i, I, and increasing with both 
arguments. Namely, 751(/, I )  with > q and > o. 
di  d l  
Given these assumptions, the payoffs to the firms discounted to t=0 are respectively. 
Continental: ^B ( i , —  C(/)- F  +  p  -TS\ i iJ)  + -Bci--Bd\  
2 2 2 
DuPont: ^B(i , I )—^B-c{i)  + p -  TSii i ,  l ) - -Bc\  + -Bd\  
2 2 2 
As before, assuming that the second order sufficient conditions are satisfied, the first 
order conditions for interior solutions are respectively. 
It is more desirable to make Bd 1 dependent on i ,  but the results are the same regardless. 
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^. 1 dBjij) 3C(/) ^ ^ 1 arsK/./) 
2 a/ a/ 
.  i a f l ( / , / )  dc(o i: 
di di 
2 a/ 
1 dTS(i,I) 
2 di 
(15) 
= 0 
Denote the solution to (15) as (i, / ). 
Evaluating (13) at (/,/)gives: 
/ : (  
/ : (  
i a ^ ( / . / )  bed) 
2 di di 
i a f l ( / , / )  dan 
)| <0 
(i.h 
dl dl 
(13')'-
< 0  
Using the same techniques employed in section 4.2 and Appendix 2D, we can draw 
the graphs below. Figure 7-A is when <0 and Figure 7-B is when > 0. 
=0 
/ 
(i, /) lies in the shaded area. 
Figure 7-A: A Graphic Proof of Result in 4.6.1 ( B^, < 0) 
r . dTSii,!) ^ dTSii,!) ^ 
' This is because of the assumptions of p > Uand p > U. 
di dl 
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=0 
=0 
(/, /) lie in the shaded area AOC. 
Figure 7-B: A Graphic Proof of Result in 4.6.1 ( >0) 
From Figure 7-A, we will get / > /, and/or J > I , or both. From Figure 7-B, both 
i > i and I > I hold. This implies that both parties are likely to make more private 
investment when future gains depend on current investment level, which is socially 
preferred when both are underinvesting in the static model relative to the optimal solutions. 
Long term relationships help to mitigate private incentive problems. In fact, when the firms 
are sufficiently patient and the impact of current investment on the future gain is big enough, 
overinvestment is possible. However, the rapid pace of industry change tends to moderate 
patience. 
With the future gains taken into account, if A = TSl{i ,  I )  -  Bel  -  Bdl  > 0, i.e., the 
new product is preferable to other outside options in the second period, HOC is more likely 
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to be marketed in the first period, and both firms are more likely to take part in the 
partnership. With no consideration for the future, the participation rules for Continental and 
DuPont are given in (16-C) and (16-D) respectively. 
Continental: + -C(/)-F > ^ (16-C) 
2 2 2 
DuPont: -B(/, I )  - -Be + -Bd -c(i) > Bd (16-D) 
2 2 2 
With a second period product, their participation rules are given in (17-C) and (17-
D): 
Continental: 
^B{i , I )  +  ^ Bc-^Bd-CiI)-F + p -  TSl( i ,  I )+-Bcl--Bdl  
2 2 2 
>Bc + pBcl  (17-C) 
DuPont: 
B(i ,  I )  — ^ Bc + Bd — c( i )  + p  -5-r5i(i,/)--5-flci+-!-flf/i 
2 2 2 
>Bd-^ pBd\  (I7-D) 
Which are equivalent to: 
Continental: ^Bii , I )  +  ^ Bc-^Bd-C{1)-F -k- p^> Be (18-C) 
DuPont: -B(i , I ) -^-Bd--Be-e( i )  + p^> Bd (I8-D) 
2 2 2 
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When the future product is more profitable than other options (A > 0), equations in 
(18) are more likely to hold than those in (16)^^. Therefore, the probability of forming 
partnership in the first period is higher than without the future profitable product. If the 
future gain A is big enough, it could happen that one of the firms enters the relationship at a 
first period loss. Clearly when A < 0, this partnership to commercialize future value-
enhanced products in the second period is not desirable and should not be undertaken. A 
possible scenario - a more competitive grain firm takes up the venture - is presented in the 
next model. 
4.6.2 A More General Model That Accounts For Incumbent Advantage 
Assume as before there are two periods, t=0, and t=l. At t=0, HOC is the product. At 
t=l, another new proprietary value-enhanced product will be introduced to the market. 
Without loss of generality, assume the time preference parameter /? = 1. 
The incumbent advantage comes from two sources - specialized physical assets and 
relationship-specific human capital. In the case of specialty grain, the specialized assets are 
small bins and other equipment designed for identity preservation; relationship-specific 
human capital is expertise developed over the process of coordination that reduces 
transaction costs and improves the effectiveness and efficiency of communication. 
" Because l )  + -Bc--Bd -  C(/) -  F + pA >-8(1,1)+-Be--Bd -  C(I)  - F and 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
j B(i ,  I )  +  ^ Bd -^Bc-  c(i)  + /OA > IB(i ,  /) + ^ Bd -1& - c(/) V(/, I ) ,  
(18-C) holds => (16-C) holds, but that (16-C) holds does not necessary lead to (18-C). Similarly, (18-D) 
holds => (16-D) holds, but not the other way around. 
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promptness in identifying and solving problems, and it also includes the experience gained 
in dealing with the end-users in marketing. 
The previous simplified model assumes away competition in the second period. In a 
dynamic business world, competition is a constant norm rather than exception. New 
innovative firms emerge to challenge established ones through improved production and 
organization efficiencies. The competitiveness of established firms also changes over time. 
Therefore, at t=l. Continental's status as the best partner will be challenged by potential 
competitors. If a more efficient competitor emerges, and the benefit to DuPont of switching 
partners outweighs the incumbent advantage, then Continental will lose the business. This 
will inevitably influence forward-looking agents' decisions at the first period. 
Assume that the problem facing a rival R*s partnership with DuPont is essentially the 
same as the one faced by the partnership between DuPont and Continental in the first period, 
which was given in Section 4.4. The total surplus distribution rule is also bargaining with 
equal bargaining power. As argued before, DuPont's first period private investment / will 
affect the second period surplus in a positive way, and this impact will be carried over to 
alliance with other partners. A rival can outperform Continental in the second period by 
dramatically lowering variable cost despite Continental's incumbent advantage. 
Let us denote the total surplus achievable by a partnership between DuPont and R as 
r5"(/°), where /°is DuPont's first period private investment i represented explicitly by its 
timing factor. Assume TS,* (i°) increases with i° di° 
The total surplus achievable by the partnership between DuPont and Continental in 
the second period is denoted as TS^(/°, 7°, F°), where 1° is the first period investment by 
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Continental, and is the first period fixed investment by Continental. The incumbent 
advantage can then be characterized by the fact that /°,F° affect r5,'^(/°,/°,F°)positively 
in addition to i° ^ ^ ^  dts^a^/^f")] > (J t > u ^riQ di° ' a/° aF° 
We say R outperforms Continental wheneverrS/'(£°)> TS[(1°,1°, F°). Suppose the 
occurrence of this event will depend on the state of the world 9g Q , which is unknown in 
the first period. But the distribution of 0 is known. For given 0 , 
F") = Prob[7'5,'^(/°) — /", F°) > oj will be inversely related to /°, 
and F° , provided that < '—^ , i.e., i°(DuPont's first f)eriod 
di di 
investment) is marginally more productive with the presence of incumbent advantage"^. 
. aP(/°,/°,F°) aP(/°,/°,F°) 8F(/°,/°,F°) 
This gives: — <0, — <Oand — <0. 
The setup of the model is as the following: 
• The new product is very profitable and participation conditions are satisfied for all 
parties concemed.^^ 
• At t=0. Continental is the most efficient partner whose partnership produces the highest 
joint surplus and is chosen to be the partner. 
Since for given 0 , 
a[r5,^/°)-r5,'"(i°,/°,F° ) ] ^ Q  a[7-5,^/°)-r5,'^(/°,/°,F°)]_ drs^ ^ 
a/° ' a/° a/° 
a[rs,^ (/°) - F5,'^(t°, /°, F° )] _ dTS[ 
dF° aF° 
The possible event that they are not satisfied can be accounted for by assigning a specific probability to it. 
As long as the payoffs are constant in that event, the results derived in the following model won't change. 
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At t=l, with probability I - F°) where 
P(/°, Prob[r5*(/°) - 75,"^(/®, /°, F°) > o]. Continental is the best partner 
in marketing the new product. And Continental is chosen as the best partner. As in the 
previous discussion, define Continental's outside option as the constant Bel and 
DuPont's as Bdl. The payoffs are respectively. 
Continental: + 
2 2 2 
DuPont: -T S ^ ( i ° +  
2 2 2 
At t=l, with probability/'(/", /", F°), a rival R outperforms Continental and DuPont 
gains more by choosing R as partner. And R is chosen as the best partner. The payoffs 
are respectively. 
Continental: Bel 
DuPont; ;r(i°) i7ri i°)>-TS^(1°,1° ,F°)  + -Bel--Bdl)  
2 2 2 
The total expected payoffs for the two firms when they make decisions at t=0 are: 
-Bi i \ l°)+-B-CU°)-F° + 
2 2 Continental: 
2 ' 2 2 
+ Pii \ l° ,F°)Bcl  
2 2 DuPont: 
-  TS^(i°  , I° ,F°)--Bel  + -Bdl  
2 * 2  2  
80 
Assume second order conditions are satisfied, the first order conditions for interior 
solutions are (19): 
ac(/°) f „,,o ,0^0,11 
^—^0 ,/ .f )i-•0  2 d/°  3/  
3/° - ts[ 
31° 
= 0 
a c ( i ° ) .  r ,  o,..o ,0 . _...o ,0 
•' % a? •' 
a/° - r5f (1°, , F°) - - flcl + - 1 - ;r(i°) 9 2 '> = 0 
Let 
A/"" =- ,.0 ,0 r-o. l  dTS^i i° , l \F°)  dPU^I^.F")  p { i  , /  , r  ) — —  a/° a/° 2 2 2 
M^ = 
-pi i \ I \F")  
dP(i \ l \F°)  
1 dTS^(i°J\F°)  d7rU°)  
2 di° di° 
then, (19) becomes (20), 
di' 
-TS[ (i°, 7°, F°) --Bel+- 1 - ;r(/°) 
2 2 2 
, 0  i d B u ^ i " )  a c ( / ° ) .  i a r s , ' ^ ( i ° , / ° , F ° )  ,  ^  
' 1^' ^*1 a? 
.0  dc(i°) , idTS^a°.r° .F°)  ,  . ,0  „  
' ^1—8? a? 
Denote the solutions to (20) as (/, /). 
Comparing (/, I) with the solutions to (15)-(/, 7) -(by construction, p = 1, 
/ = /",/ = 7°, and 751(/, 7) = TS^(/°, 7°,F°)). Their relationship is dependent on the signs 
o f  M a n d  M ° and is ambiguous in general. Equations (15) give the case when the new 
product is superior to other options and Continental has no competition from rivals and will 
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undertake the project with certainty. When competition comes along, it poses a possibility 
that Continental won't get the benefit of its investment in the second period, while at the 
same time. Continental can reduce this possibility by increasing its first period investment. 
By the assumptions we have made about the relationship specificity of investment 
and the bargaining rules, < 0 But the sign of \s unambiguous. 
Case 1: >0 
This case results when gain from the new product (/°, 7°, F°) - Bel - Bd\\ is 
large, or the marginal impact of Continental's investment on the probability of It's 
dp(i^ / °  
outperforming ( ) is large, or both. In this case, the marginal benefit from 
dl  
reducing the possibility of losing to R outweighs the expected loss from losing. Provided 
that all the previous assumptions hold, we will get unambiguous result- i  < T ,  and I  > T ;  
i.e.. Continental invests more and DuPont invests less in the presence of competition. The 
intuition here is that competition in the second period improves the prospect for DuPont and 
it is to its benefit to make the actual realization of competition more likely by reducing its 
first period investment. To Continental, competition poses a threat of not being able to enjoy 
superb gain in the second period, so it tries to decrease the possibility of the actual 
realization of that threat. 
36 „ dP(i \ l \F°)  ^  ,  
By assumptions, < 0 and 
.-0 di  
di° ^ 
I dTS^a^I^F")  d/r( i°)  
- T S ^  ( i ° j \ F ° ) - - B c l + - B d l - )  
2 2 2 
<0. 
di . 0  di' 
(investments are relationship specific) and equal bargaining power make 
> 0 .  
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Case 2: 
I  dTS^(i° j \F°)  dPa\l° ,F°)[  1 
2 ' 2 2 2 a/° 8/° 
This case results when gains from the new product /°, F°) - Bel - Bd\\ is 
small or the marginal impact of Continental's investment on the probability of U's 
fipd^ /O J- 1 
outperforming ( —-) is small, or the probability of losing to If [l - f (/°, /°, F°)Jis 
ol 
big, or all of them. With the assumptions we have made, we will get i < i ,  o r  / < /, or both. 
DuPont underinvests in order to induce more competition, and Continental invests less 
because the expected marginal benefit in the second period derived from its present 
investment is reduced significantly by the high probability of losing to R and/or this 
expected benefit is relatively small. 
That DuPont will underinvest may sound counterintuitive. This hinges on the 
assumptions that is marginally more productive inside the existing relationship and with 
certain probability partnership with R produces a bigger payoff to DuPont. With R, i°is less 
productive, and meanwhile, a smaller means a higher probability that R wins the project 
resulting a bigger payoff. 
In summary, firms' decisions on investing to achieve incumbent advantage are 
contingent. The party (DuPont), which may stand to gain by changing business partners in 
the future, is more likey to underinvest in an existing relationship versus when the 
relationship is expected to continue with certainty. The party (Continental), which may stand 
to lose by a dissolved relationship in the future, is likely to invest more when the stake in 
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losing is high and/or the incumbent advantage measured by the investment's impact on the 
continuance of the reiationship is high; and it tends to invest less when otherwise. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL EVALUATIONS OF THE THEORETICAL MODELS 
Information that is relevant in evaluating the models presented in Chapter 4 comes 
from the participants in the value chain, namely DuPont, the growers, elevators. Continental, 
other grain firms, and end-users. Newspapers, trade journal articles, academic studies, and 
surveys by concerned organizations provide a fairly good amount of this information. The 
evidence collected mostly confirms the assumptions and the results of the various models. 
5.1 Survey Administered by the U.S. Feed Grain Council 
Theoretical results from the previous chapter are generally supported by the findings 
of surveys regarding VEC (value-enhanced com)^' which were conducted by the U.S. Feed 
Grains Council. Although the survey was not targeted solely at HOC, HOC is found to be 
the most commonly grown and the fastest growing type of VEC as defined by the Council. 
And the generality of the survey questions allows for easy use in evaluating the HOC. The 
Council has compiled test and survey results and analysis of the VEC market in the main 
com producing states since the 1995/96 growing season. The majority of data collection has 
been concentrated in the top seven com exporting states- Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Indiana, 
Minnesota, Ohio, and Missouri. In 1997/98, 5535 surveys were sent to grain producers in 
the region. 1837 responses were received in 1997. Findings that are relevant in evaluating 
the models in this paper are summarized below. 
VEC is defined as com with particular quality characteristics that add end-user value. Pp3 the survey found 
that HOC was the most commonly grown and the fastest growing type of VEC. 
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Producers were asked to rate the factors that influenced their decisions to plant VEC. 
Those who raised VEC in 1997 rated the premiums paid for the VEC and previous 
experience with VEC production as the most important factors influencing their decision to 
produce VEC. Other significant positive factors are being part of the emerging market, 
buyer/elevator encouragement, and seed sales encouragement (see Figure 8). 
Previous Good Preniums Be Fait of Seed Sales Buyer/Elevator 
Resuks Emerging Market Encouragement Encouragement 
Figure 8: Producers' Reasons for Growing VEC in 1997 (U.S. Feed Grains Council, 
1998) (Note: the producers were asked to rate the factors on a 1 to 5 scale with a score of 5 
being very important.) 
For those producers not raising VEC in 1997, lack of incentives to produce VEC, 
and the fact that they were content with the current hybrids/returns they obtained from their 
commodity com were the most important reasons (see Figure 9). Other significant factors 
are lack of market in the residing area, reports of poor experience from others and poor prior 
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Happy Wkh No Market in My Poor Prior Reports of Pcxjr Lack of Incentives 
Current Area Experence Experience from 
Hybrids/Return Others 
Figure 9: Producers' Reasons for Not Growing VEC in 1997 (U.S. Feed Grains 
Council, 1998) (Note: the producers were asked to rate the factors on a 1 to 5 scale with a 
score of 5 being very important.) 
experience with VEC. Producers also mentioned that the lack of information about specialty 
com, or that they use all their com for feed as drawbacks to VEC production. 
That producers being content with growing commodity com is one of the major 
reasons they decided against growing VEC supports the theory that the biggest competitor to 
VEC is commodity com, and that our modeling of grower's acreage decisions choosing 
between growing HOC and commodity com is adequate. 
Secondly, the fmdings clearly show that growers need adequate incentives and 
information to engage in raising VEC. VEC, or specialty grains in general, require identity 
preservation to preserve its added value relative to their commodity counterparts; the 
number of both potential producers and buyers of these specialty grains are relatively small. 
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which increases marketing risk. New varieties of seeds are associated with production 
uncertainty. There are often additional costs such as seed premiums and segregation and 
handling costs. To compensate for these additional costs and the perceived increased risks in 
production and marketing, financial incentives must be provided to growers, and premiums 
are the foremost important factor in growers' decisions. Most farmers regard raising HCX! as 
a way to increase their income. HOC must provide competitive returns to commodity com in 
order for the growers to produce it. 
Thirdly, information availability plays a decisive role in growers' decisions. New 
products are perceived to have more risk as compared with those familiar ones. Risk averse 
agents are reluctant to take on additional risk without compensation. More information helps 
to reduce the perceived risk and thus the necessary compensation to induce risk averse 
agents to take on the risk. 
Equally important at the introductory stage of a new type of value-enhanced grains is 
communicating information about its added value to end-users. The added value is 
ultimately realized by the end-uses. End-users will not pay a premium for value unless they 
understand where the value comes from and how to capture it. The intrinsic characteristics 
of the grains are not readily verifiable by traditional grading standards, and in some cases, 
some practices have to be changed to capture their maximum value. For example, feed 
rations need to be reformulated optimally to achieve the best value of HOC. Some producers 
indicated that they had no interest in VEC production since they use all their com for feed, 
which may indicate there is a lack of information on the value of on-farm feeding of VEC 
types such as HOC. On the other hand, information from seed sales representatives and 
elevators are conducive to VEC production. 
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In fact, DuPont has conducted numerous experiments on HOC. It has production and 
sales representatives located across the Midwest, plus nutritionists and other product 
development specialists, who assist companies or individuals interested in jointly developing 
market opportunities. These working relationships are believed to have been critical in the 
early growth of the HOC market. DuPont also has a website sharing information on HOC 
including its feed value, contracting opportunities, so that interested growers can do the 
contracting directly on the web. This helps to spread the information on HOC and facilitates 
the contracting process for both growers and elevators. Today, growers can get all kinds of 
information on Optimum's products and contract for production online (See Appendix 4 for 
Optimum contracting system). 
Conceivably, end-users in the foreign countries will as well require convincing 
information on the value of a new product such as HOC and how to utilize the value in an 
optimal way before they commit to use the product. Big international importers usually 
work closely with multinational grain companies such as Continental Grain. Information and 
assistance from these exporting grain companies will help new products to gain over 
overseas customers and expand the products' market, especially at the beginning stage of the 
new variety. 
Fourthly, positive externalities do exist in the popularizing process of a VEC. 
Previous experience with VEC production is cited as one of the two most important reasons 
that producers decide to get into VEC production. Although the turnover rate of VEC 
producers is a little bit high, some producers do stick with the practice after a good 
experience. Word of mouth is the oldest and sometimes most powerful tool to spread 
information. Poor experiences of neighbors did lead some people to stay away from VEC; 
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but gcK)d experiences of neighbors have the same power to lead the onlookers into the 
actions. Learning by doing is a self-enhancing process. Fear of uncertainty associated with a 
new product can be reduced and gradually managed during the producing process. 
Experiences are equally enhancing for end-users too. Positive results from new 
products are the most concrete evidences needed to continue using the product. Customers 
will come to a good product repeatedly. In cases that there are set up costs associated with 
switching to a new product, positive first time experience will be a more powerful factor. 
This also implies it is easier to retain a satisfied customer than to acquire one in the first 
place. For HOC, an end-user doesn't have to reformulate its feed ration or acquire new (if 
any) processing equipment twice if it decides to continue to use HOC after it uses it 
successfully. 
In summary, the findings are consistent with our views. Growers' decision to plant 
HOC is influenced by their risk attitudes, the price premium they obtain and additional costs 
such as seed premiums they pay relative to commodity com, among other things. During the 
introduction period, services in the form of information and technical assistance are an 
important factor for producers to grow HOC and end-users to adopt a new product. A 
positive inter-period externality exists in popularizing a new product. 
5.2 DuPont and Continental 
The proposed model suspects that given the limited monopoly power of DuPont, the 
governance structure of the value chain is efficient. The choice of governance structure, in 
the view of transaction cost economics and property rights theory, will be determined by 
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safeguarding ex post opportunistic behaviors in the presence of relationship-specific 
investments and by aligning ex ante incentive to make private investment. 
It is difficult to test the proposal directly. The details of the agreement between the 
two firms are not public information. We don't know how DuPont and Continental share the 
cost and revenue exactly from marketing HCXT, but we do know retrospectly that both firms 
exacted great effort to expand the market of HOC and those efforts paid off in the growing 
acceptance and popularity of HCXI! among both growers and end-users. Continental had 
converted half of its international feed customers to HOC users by early 1999 (Hayenga and 
Wisner, 1999). 
However, we can test the proposal indirectly by examining the evolution of the 
contractual relationship. If the close relationship at the beginning was determined by the 
importance of both firms' private investment due to the need to create a new market for a 
new product, then as the market matures over time, the importance of one or both firms' 
private investment will diminish and their relationship will change correspondingly. 
Continental has set up dedicated facilities to handle specialty grains including HOC, and a 
significant number of its feed customers have adopted HOC. It seems its unmeasurable 
efforts to provide information to convert end users and manage the merchandising are no 
longer as important as before. DuPont, on the other hand, is still continuing to do research to 
improve the quality of HOC by stacking more desirable genes on to it, which will improve 
both the input and output traits of HOC (see Table 2). This investment in R&D is important 
to further the success of HOC. Therefore, we expect DuPont's private investment to remain 
important while we expect that of Continental to diminish over time. This implies DuPont 
will continue to control the marketing of HOC closely but Continental will lose some of the 
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control. As a matter of fact, we observe that DuPont has signed on more grain firms to 
market HOC overseas over time. For example, on June 8, 1999, Optimum Quality Grain 
announced marketing agreements with AMD and ConAgra Trade Group as strategic 
partners to manage the growing export demand for Optimum HOC (Feedstuffs). At this 
stage when HOC has achieved a certain degree of acceptance among end-users, DuPont can 
buy services from grain firms and take the residual income itself. 
We can also look at emerging products with proprietary bio-engineered quality traits 
(see Table 1). Monsanto is another major player in the biotechnology field besides DuPont. 
Monsanto has acquired a large number of seed technology patents through research and 
mergers and acquisitions, and it is poised to bring a series of value-enhanced grains into 
commercialization. On May 18, 1999, Monsanto and Cargill-a major multinational firm 
(which is set to acquire Continental) announced the formation of a global joint venture to 
create and market new products enhanced through biotechnology for the grain processing 
and animal feed markets (Feedstuffs, 1999). The 50-50 joint venture will combine 
Monsanto's capabilities in genomics, biotechnology and seeds with Cargill's global 
agricultural market to capture the value of innovation through seed technology. The joint 
venture is a profit sharing project at the beginning stage of market development of 
proprietary value-enhanced grains. 
Other developments in the agricultural biotech sector are also consistent with the 
view that incentives to make private efforts play a role in shaping the governance structures. 
As we observed earlier in Section 2.4, the major chemical concerns' acquisitions of biotech 
firms started in earnest only after the first seeds with genetically modified input traits began 
to be commercialized, or in essence, when the bio-seeds products are produced. The benefit 
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of the unions between chemical and biotech firms comes mainly from the complementarity 
between the assets to produce chemicals and the assets to produce biotech seeds. However, 
those M&As did not occur at the earlier stage of the biotechnology which was characterized 
by intense R«&D efforts. This has to do with the fact that R&D are prone to uncertainty and 
difficult, if not impossible to monitor, and private efforts are crucial to the success of a R&D 
project. Therefore, it is optimal to give ownership of the project to those whose private 
efforts are of vital importance. When the R&D produce patents and commercial products are 
being produced, the importance of the researchers' private efforts diminish, which permits 
an acquisition by another firm to be made without suffering two much loss from reduced 
private efforts. 
The split between drug and agribusiness provides an example from the other way 
around. The creation of a so-called life science firm in the middle of 90s was based on the 
expectation that synergy can be achieved between agri-biotech assets and pharmaceutical 
assets. The synergy has turned out not to be big enough to offset the negative effect resulting 
from the integration. Agri-biotech and pharmaceutical businesses are both research-intensive 
and subject to private incentive problems. Integration has a negative impact on those private 
incentives. If the synergy between the two sets of assets is not large, as it seems at this stage, 
the life-science firms may well benefit by splitting into two separate identities. As science 
and technology advances, the knowledge on agri-biotech and pharmaceuticals may very well 
converge and these two businesses will be re-married in the future. An alternative argument 
for the splits is because of the controversies surrounding genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs). It is true that stock prices of those life science firms have been depressed and the 
Wall Street has put on pressure on the firms to split the business. If this argument is true. 
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then this behavior is a short phenomenon and we will see these two lines of businesses get 
back together as the controversies over GMOs are being revolved. 
Conclusions 
We have analyzed the governance structure of the value-adding partnership in 
commercializing a proprietary value-enhanced grain-HOC, and in particular, the alliance 
formed between the technology provider-DuPont and a grain exporter-Continental. We 
found that at the early stage, DuPont's biotechnology and Continental's grain export assets 
are complementary to create a market for HOC, and relationship-specific private 
investments are important, which may determine the governance structure of the cooperation 
between the two firms. It is optimal to give each a partial ownership of complementary 
assets when both of their private efforts are essential; and when only one party contributes 
important private efforts, this party should have sole ownership of the project. The relative 
importance of these private efforts will change over time due to the evolution of technology 
and competition, so will the governance structure. This may shed some light on the 
commercialization of other proprietary value-enhanced grains. We will see more 
coordination at the beginning of the market creation, and less when a market is created and 
the volume of production expands to a certain scale. 
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APPENDIX 1 
RECENT RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITIES 
Consolidation between chemicals, biotech and seed firms: Monsanto has been the most 
aggressive in mergers and acquisitions. In 1996 and 1997, it went on a buying spree which ended 
with acquiring 16 biotech or seed firms. Its large deals include the following: 
• It acquired Asgrow Agronomics which had a 5% worldwide share of the com seed market and 
an 18% worldwide soybean seed market in September, 1996. 
• It purchased Holden's Foundation Seeds Inc. (a leading foundation seed company) in January 
1997. 
• It fmalized an agreement to buy Calgene in April 1997. Calgene is an agriculture biotechnology 
company that had done significant research in oils, fresh produce and cotton. The two firms 
signed an oilseed collaboration agreement in June 1996, and Monsanto gained the control of the 
firm by increasing its equity ownership interest from 49.9 to 54.6%. 
• It completed the purchase of DeKalb Genetics, then the 2"* largest U.S. seed firm, in December 
1998. When Monsanto announced to buy out E>eKalb in May 1998, it had previously acquired 
40% of the equity stake in I>eKalb. 
• It announced to buy the international seed business from Cargill in June 1998. 
DuPont is another player in the sector that aggressively seeks to transform itself into a life 
science company that pursues a synergy among biotech, drug, nutrition and agriculture. Besides 
some small acquisitions and extensive alliances, its most significant acquisition is Pioneer Hibred 
International. 
• DuPont and Pioneer signed an agreement that DuPont would buy the 80% stake in Pioneer that it 
did not already own in March 1999. Pioneer became a wholly owned subsidiary of DuPont 
subesequently. The acquisition followed a close relationship between the two firms dating back 
to 1997. In 1997, they entered a three-part strategic alliance: A research partnership which 
included a broad research collaboration, a joint venture Optimum Quality Grains, L.L.C., and a 
20% equity investment by DuPont in Pioneer. 
Other acquisitions in this sector include: 
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• Dow Agrosciences announced its intention to acquire Mycogen in October 1998. Mycogen had 
4% market share in com seed market. Dow Agrosciences had 69% of the equity in Mycogen 
before that. 
• Dow Agrosciences also acquired part of Dlinois Foundation Seeds which provides foundation 
seeds for 11% of branded seed com sales by other companies. 
• AgrEvo, a Berlin-based joint venture between Hoechst and Schering, announced they planned to 
acquire CargilKs domestic seed business in 1998, the deal however, has never been completed 
due to concerns about the marketability of biotech based products. 
• Cargill, which didn't have access to biotechnology and the new genetic products produced by it, 
sold its international seed businesses to Monsanto. 
Split between drug and agribusiness: After the flurry of mergers between drug and 
agricultural biotech flrms to create a "life-science" conglomerate in earlier years, there is now a trend 
going in the reverse direction-some firms are splitting their pharmaceutical and agribusiness. 
• Novartis and AstraZeneca agreed to spin off and merge Novartis Crop Protection and Seeds 
business and Zeneca Agrochemicals to create the world's first dedicated agribusiness company in 
December 1999. Novartis will focus on its healthcare - pharmaceuticals business. AstraZeneca 
was created by the take-over of Zeneca, the UK life science leader, by Astra, a pharmaceutical 
company based in the Neverthlands. Novartis was the combination of Sandoz and Ciba 
Geigy.The new firm- to be named Syngenta-would be No. 1 in Crop protection and No. 3 in 
seeds with S7.9 billion in combined 1998 sales. They have complementary product portfolios 
and strong global sales and marketing culture. It will have a strong innovation platform in 
chemistry and plant technology. 
• On March 21, 2000, American Home Products (AHP), the No.5 U.S. drug-maker, announced 
that it was exiting the agriculture business to focus on its core businesses of pharmaceuticals and 
consumer products. It will sell its Cyanamid crop-protection unit to the German chemicals firm 
BASF AG. AHP acquired Cyanamid in 1994. 
Alliances between biotech firms and grain companies: Several biotech firms have formed 
alliances with grain companies to create tnarkets for value-enhanced grains. 
• DuPont and Continental Grain formed an alliance to market HOC in early 1996. It later signed 
agreements with ADM and ConAgra to market HOC in 1998. 
• Novartis announced an agreement to form a joint venture with Land O'Lakes to produce 
specialty com products in 1998. 
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• Monsanto and Cargili formed a joint venture to arrange production and market value-enhanced 
grain 1998. 
Consolidation of the grain companies: Joint ventures and acquisitions are common among 
grain companies as well. 
• In November 1998, Cargili announced that it intended to acquire Continental Grain's grain 
storage, transportation, export and trading operations in North America, Europe, Latin America 
and Asia with customers in over 100 countries. The two firms are the top grain exporters in the 
U.S.. 
• In March 1999, two of the largest U.S. farm cooperatives. Farmland Industries Inc. and Cenex 
Harvest States, announced plans to merge portions of their grain businesses. 
(Note: the information above is collected from www.quote.vahoo and Feedstuffs.) 
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APPENDIX 2 
PROOFS 
A: Section 4.2.2-CARA Utility Function 
A CARA Utility Function and Normality E{u)°^ w — 
A CARA ut i l i ty  funct ion  i s  represented  by:  u = a—be~^.  
(H—W)-
w ~ N{w,cr l )^  f (wlw, (Tl )  = —j=—e 
(»—H-)-
dw 
V2;ro-^ 
{w—w)'  •¥ZX(T^w 
42na 
= f ^ C dw 
_ J (H— 
^ S5—^ 
— I . . . (H—H'+X^)~ 
-Aw-t—A*<T; ^ 1 
= e ' (I —e ' " aw = 1 since it is the 
cumulative function of w — " N(w- A<7^.,(T^.)) 
=> ) oc —Aw + ^ A"<t^ (e' is an increasing function of x) 
=> <= —w + -^A<T^ (A>0) 
) oc w — — 
2 
=> £(m) oc w —— ( E (m)o= E ( — )  
2 
=> max £•({<) <=> max(w ——A<t^) 
w  * ^ 2  
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B: A Proof of Results In 4.2.2 
dA2 _  (y i -e -ApAcr; )A\y ' (T;  • i - (p  + Y)']- '2\yy + ip + r)e - s - ApAYcr;^\ya; +ip + r)^r] 
dy  +(p  + y) - (T; f  
(A2-1) 
dA2 The necessary and sufficient condition for > o is: 
dy 
i y + £ -  A p A c r ; ) \ y - t T ;  +  (p + yfer;]-if/y + (p + y)7-s- ^ Aya-;][/(T- +(p + y)o-;]>0 (A 
2-2) 
Let d = —y'cti +(p '  — Y ' )0'l ,  then (A2-2) can be written as: 
i y  +  E ) b +  y i p  + y)<Tg]> ApAalb  (A2-3) 
Case (I): b> 0, then (A2-3) becomes (A2-4): 
(y + e)--^^—^.2\y-cr; + y(p + > ApAa; (A2-A) 
y b 
WithA2 >0 implying {y- i t -e ) -——^ > y^/7Ao'J(A2-5), 
Y 
^(y'^v + /(/'•'" 1 ^ ^  sufficient condition for (A2-4) to hold. 
b 
Case (2), b  < 0 ,  then (A2-3) becomes (A2-6): 
{y + e)-^^y^2\y-a; + yip + < ^Aa; (A2-6) 
It is possible that (8) holds for A2 > 0 because (A2-6) and (A2-5) may coexist due to 
(y + e)—^^—^.2\y-(Tl + yip + y)cr-]^<(y + e)-^ ^  ^  -
y - b y 
C: A Proof of the Sign of 0  ^ In Section 4.4.1 
Let 6 be the total surplus to Dupont and Continental as in equation 4, that is 
e = TSiy, s) = E[r(s)A2(Y, s) + (p + P)Y -{p + Y)Y-F- VC(X)] {Al-7). 
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The first order condition for maximizing d with respect to the price premium () is given in 
equation 5 from Chapter 4. We repeat it here for convenience. 
[r (s )  +  ( /3  -  rXy + £)] -^— A2(y ,  s ) iy  +  e ) -E (f/ 
dVC dA2 i y  +  £ )  = 0 (5). 
Equation S can be rearranged to give 
dVC 
r ( s )  +  ( ^ - y K y  +  £ ) - E  
dY 
i y  +  £ )  BA2 
dy 
= A2(y ,s ) (y  + £)  (A2-8). 
The derivative of 0 with respect to y is the same as that in (5), specifically 
^a2 
dY dy 
e = [r(5) + (>9 - r)(>' + £)\-^— A2{y, 5)(y + £) -E ( fy  
Differentiating A2-9 with respect to s will yield 
^  , n  -1^^A2 -  -3^2 da2ms) 
e, = Ik.) ne-yky*  ^17  ^
(y + e) (A2-9). 
dY dsdy dy 
= |r (5)  + (>S -  y){y  + £) - ]  a^A2 J dsdy  
(A2-10) 
— 8A2 dA2 dr(s) 
- (y  + £) -r -  + 
- 4  
a VC dA2 
We can sign the coefficient of 
ds  dy  ds  |  dY^ dy  
d^a2 
( y  +  £ )  
A2-8 is positive and we assume 
dsdy  
dA2 
in A2-10 using equation A2-8. Because the right hand side of 
da2 
> 0, the coefficient of 
dy dy 
must be greater than zero and 
this coefficient is the same as the coefficient of d^a2 
dsdy  
in A2-10. This then implies that 
r ( s )  +  ( / 9 - y ) ( y  +  £ ) - E  dVC 
dY 
i y  +  £ )  > 0  (A2-11). 
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We can also sign 
Chapter 4 as 
d^a2 
dsdy  
by computing the relevant derivatives. First rewrite equation 3 from 
(p + r)£-s-apayet;+ry^^^ 
^2 = r , ,— O) 
Now take the derivative of 3 with respect to s as follows 
,  ,  T'— y i l r  + ( p + r )  
This derivative is negative because A > 0 and all other terms are squared. Differentiating again we 
obtain 
a-A2 
dsdy 
= \^\y^<Tl+ip + y)^(yl\^ +2{p + y)(T;]>0 (A2-13). 
Equation A2-13 will be positive because A > 0, y > 0, p > 0, and all other terms are squared. This 
implies the entire first term in A2-10 is positive. The second term in A2-I0 is positive because we 
dA2 have shown in equation A2-12 that —-— < 0 , that is 
ds 
— — ()A2 
-(y + £)^>0 (A2-14). 
as 
The third term is positive because of our assumption in Chapter 4 that > 0 and ^ ^  ^ . We 
dy as 
than have 
3A2 dr(s )  
> 0  (A2-15). 
dy ds 
The first three terms in A2-10 are thus positive and the overall sign of 0^^ will depend on the sign 
d-VC dA2 
and magnitude of — E 
ar-  dy  
gram 
dY-
< 0  
(y + f) 
aA2 
. If there are increasing returns to size in the handling of 
, then given that —— > 0, this term will also be positive and the overall sign of 
dy 
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f ;i2 
9 will be positive. It there are decreasing returns to size in the handling of grain d^vc dy^ > 0  
dA2 
then given that > 0, then this term will be negative and could cause the overall derivative to 
dy 
be negative. Increasing returns to scale may well be the most reasonable assumption during the early 
stages of the commercialization of HOC. Whether decreasing returns at higher output levels 
dominate in the later stages is an open empirical question. Summarizing, 
d-VC dA2 If < 0, then — E 
If 
3v-
d-vc 
d Y -
— > 0, then - E 
dy- dy 
d-VC dA2 
dr-  dy  
(y + e) 
(y + e) 
> 0, and > 0. 
< 0, and the sign of 0^, is ambiguous. 
D: A Proof of the Result in 4.4.2 
Let <p = TS{i,I) = Bii, I) — F — c{i) - C(I), then (12) becomes; 
i :  =  0  
I :(p, =0 
(/*, /*) is the optimal solution to (12'). 
The second order condition is: H = <Pu <Pu 
<Pn <Pi, 
is negative definite, which gives: 
(Pn < 0' (Pll < - 9,I<Pli > 0 
Using (12') and the Implicit Function Theorem, we will get: 
>0=:> <Pn > <Pii 
<Pii <Pii 
di 
Hi 9J.=0 
= _:^,and^ 
<p. ^ «>,=o Vn 
Evaluating (12') at (/,/) using > Ogives< Oand <p,\- <0 when 
B-f <0; >Oand >0 when 8^, > 0. We can't sign B^, in general. 
Using the results obtained above, we can draw the graphs in Figure 5-A and Figure 5-B. 
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APPENDIX 3 
VALUE OF HOC 
A number of tests and experiments have been conducted to determine the intrinsic value of 
HOC by researchers in various firms and organizations. Almost all of them conclude that HOC 
contains a much higher oil level than conventional com, oil content is increased at the expense of 
starch. A study by the U.S. Feed Grain Council in 1998 shows HOC has 7.2% oil compared with 
4.4% oil in commodity com, and starch of 64.8% to 70.6% (see Table A3.1). The amount of energy 
available for metabolism from com starch is 4,040 kcal/kg and of com oil 7,350 kcal/kg. Thus, for 
each one-percent unit of com starch replaced by com oil, there should be a net increase of 33.3 
kcal/kg of metabolizable energy. More metabolizable energy means greater feed value. In addition, 
the cmde protein level in HOC tends to be higher than commodity com, so the concentration of key 
amino acids in HOC should be higher (see table A3.1). Preliminary data obtained from pig 
experiments suggests that the amino acids in HOC are somewhat more digestible than those found in 
traditional yellow dent com. 
Reports evaluating the nutritive value of HOC for poultry, swine and cow (Yu, 1998) find 
several potential advantages of using HOC. The most obvious one is reducing feed costs by 
substituting HOC for more expensive feed supplements such as soybean meal, fat and amino acid. It 
provides a consistent source of metabolizable energy and amino acid with consistent quality, and 
reduces the risk associated with the usage of added fats of unknown or poor quality. The latter is 
especially valuable in tropical countries where handling fat is not only greasy but also costly. In 
countries where fat is prohibited to be used as animal feed by religion, HOC fares even better. It is 
even more cost effective for smaller feeders who buy fat at a higher price and mix fat with other feed 
ingredients at a higher cost than big livestock producers. HOC also provides more choices for feed 
formulation (Crum and Stilbom, 1997). 
Less obviously, HOC has some additional benefits such as much lower dust levels in feeding 
operations, improved palatability, better uniformity in mixing, and easier handling of feeds. These 
attributes add value but are often situation dependent, and are more difficult to quantify in direct 
financial terms for a general situation, (see http://www.ncga.com/02profits/HighOil/premval2.html 
National Com Growers Association's website) 
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Table A3.1 Average Nutrient Composition of Conventional Com and HOC 
Nutrient HOC Commodity com 
Oil, % (d.b.) 7.2 4.4 
Protein, % (d.b.) 9.9 9.4 
Starch, % (d.b.) 64.8 70.6 
Fiber, % (d.b.) 2.9 2.3 
Lysine, % 0.28 0.28 
Methionine, % 0.20 0.17 
Threonine, % 0.31 0.30 
Tryptophan, % 0.07 0.06 
Source: 1997-1998 Value-enhanced Com Quality Report by U.S. Feed Grain Council, pp5 
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APPENDIX 4 
THE OPTIMUM CONTRACTING SYSTEM 
DuPont has utilized internet to provide information and do contracting from the early stage 
of HOC commercialization. The website started as DuPont Quality Grains and posted detailed 
information on the feed value of HOC and grower contracting. The first export program was the one 
with Continental Grain. Growers can log onto the website and do the contracting via an internet 
system called OSCAR. Now, the website has evolved into the current one held by Optimum Quality 
Grains, L.L.C. (Optimum) at www.itsoptimum.com. Optimum worked with both overseas livestock 
producers and domestic growers/feeders to help create a market for HOC. It has been sponsoring 
field trials by independent researchers to substantiate and refine the advantages of HOC in feed 
nutrition. Those trial results are readily available at its website. The contracting programs have 
expanded to include both export and domestic programs on not only HOC but also other value-
enhanced grains such as High Oleic HOC and STS soybeans. The electronic system brings the 
growers and elevators/feeders/processors together, and both Optimum and its grain partners can 
easily monitor the contracting progress. However, Optimum's role is different with domestic and 
export contracts. For domestic contracts. Optimum only serves as an intermediary that connects the 
growers and elevators/feeders/processors, and it is not a legal party to the domestic production 
contracts. For export contracts. Optimum is a legal party to the contracts and stands behind them. 
All the export contracts are fairly standardized (see a sample contract in Appendix 4). The 
contract is for a quantity of acres; a grower is required to buy seeds from a list of companies that 
have licensed HOC technology from DuPont. The product must meet physical quality specifications. 
Pricing is based on the Elevator cash price for U.S. No.2 yellow com plus a fixed premium based 
upon the oil content of the grain. The higher the oil content, the higher the premium. The contracts 
grant Optimum and/or its appointed agents free and easy access to the fields to inspect, evaluate and 
monitor the progress and condition of the crop. 
The Optimum electronic contracting system, as other e-commerce tools, has greatly 
facilitated the information dissemination and managing the business. It makes it much easier for 
Optimum to monitor and coordinate the activities of the growers and its grain partners. Growers gain 
easy access to useful knowledge and assistance firom Optimum. The participating grain firms and 
processors can use the system to monitor and plan its activities in an up-to-date fashion. This system 
105 
reduces variable transaction costs for all participants, and is an investment that benefits all. The 
investor. Optimum (or DuPont) stands to benefit most from this system. 
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APPENDIX 5 
A SAMPLE OF HOC GROWER CONTRACT 
Contract Number: #CONTRACT ID 
Originator: OriginFName OriginLName OriginatorPhone OriginatorCompany 
Program: Optimum Quality Grains, L.L.C. /Consolidated Grain and Barge 
Optimum Quality Grains, L.L.C. 
2000 EXPORT MARKETING AGREEMENT 
FOR OPTIMUM® HIGH OIL CORN 
Buyer's call 
THIS AGREEMENT is made DATE between GrowerDisplayName (hereinafter 'GROWER') and 
Optimum Quality Grains, L.L.C. (hereinafter 'OPTIMUM'), and relates to the production and delivery 
of OPTIMUM® high-oil com grain (hereinafter "OPTIMUM GRAIN") from certain high-oil hybrid seed 
corn or TC BLEND® seed com (hereinafter collectively 'HOC SEED'). GROWER and OPTIMUM are 
experienced and knowledgeable in the cultivation of com and business transactions involving com. 
1. GENERAL TERMS 
a. GROWER shall produce and deliver an 'Identity Preserved' crop from HOC SEED purchased 
from seed companies that are on the 2000 OPTIMUM HOC SEED company list (see Attachment A). 
b. GROWER shall produce the highest quality grain possible and meet the specifications in Article 3. 
GROWER shall take all measures to prevent contaminants during growing and handling OPTIMUM 
GRAIN, and may not blend with non-OPTIMUM GRAIN. 
0. GROWER agrees to sell and deliver 100% of the contracted production of OPTIMUM GRAIN to 
ELEVATORNAME(hereinafter "ELEVATOR"). All marketing activities and GROWER payments will 
be handled by the ELEVATOR or a replacement elevator or grain merchandiser designated by 
OPTIMUM and shall be subject to a separate grain purchase agreement between GROWER and 
ELEVATOR. 
d. GROWER agrees to plant and grow TOTALQuantity acres of OPTIMUM GRAIN. Pricing and 
GROWER compensation for the OPTIMUM GRAIN are in Artk:le 4. If GROWER is unable to perform 
all terms of this Agreement for any reason, GROWER agrees to promptly notify both OPTIMUM (1-
888-707-7648) and ELEVATOR. 
e. GROWER will purchase 
SEEDCOMPANIES 
* Seed company name is required for the Agreement to be valid. If GROWER purchases seed from 
seed company(s) other than as designated above, whether due to unavailability of seed or 
GROWER'S choice, or is unable to purchase seed in order to perform this Agreement, GROWER 
agrees to promptly notify OPTIMUM by calling 1-888-707-7648. Neither OPTIMUM nor any seed 
company designated above guarantees seed availability or sale. 
f. GROWER is to request and read the specifk:ations and the complete Purchase Agreement and the 
Limitation of Warranty and Liability associated with all HOC SEED purchased for use under this 
Agreement. GROWER agrees to abide by the temns and conditions of the Purchase Agreement. 
g. GROWER grants OPTIMUM and/or its appointed agents free and easy access to the fields to 
inspect, evaluate and monitor the progress and condition of the crop. 
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h. GROWER agrees not to use any grain storage chemicals - either applied directly to the OPTIMUM 
GRAIN or to the storage structure in which the OPTIMUM GRAIN is to be stored, and GROWER 
further agrees to certify compliance with this provision. 
i. To minimize risk of cross-pollination, GROWER agrees that he will not plant HOC SEED within 50 
feet of any transgenic or GMO (genetically modified organism) com; and GROWER further agrees to 
certify his compliance with this provision. 
j. For purposes of this agreement, transgenic or GMO (genetically modified organism) com" refers 
to a crop produced from seed containing DNA from another organism; e.g., Bt-derived insect 
resistance. Roundup Ready ® or Liberty Link ® herbk;ide resistance, etc. 
2. DELIVERY AND STORAGE 
a. Delivery is BUYER'S CALL. GROWER shall deliver the dried OPTIMUM GRAIN to ELEVATOR 
with transportation costs paid by the GROWER. For OPTIMUM GRAIN redirected by OPTIMUM to 
another facility, that receiving location on behalf of OPTIMUM will pay additional transportation costs. 
b. The delivery period(s) shall be the following: 
DeiiveryWIndows 
The ELEVATOR will provide a minimum of one week pre-advice of the requested delivery date. 
0. GROWER must get written permission from ELEVATOR to change delivery period. In the event of 
a delay in the designated delivery period caused by ELEVATOR or OPTIMUM, GROWER will be 
compensated on all priced bushels at a rate of $0.0007 cent per bushel per day from the last day of 
the delivery period indk:ated above until the OPTIMUM GRAIN is called. All OPTIMUM GRAIN must 
be delivered no later than August 31, 2001. 
d. GROWER shall not allow or cause any liens or security interests to be placed on the OPTIMUM 
GRAIN that would prevent the unencumtered delivery of the High Oil Com grain or that conveys 
ownership of the crop to anyone other than the GROWER, the ELEVATOR or OPTIMUM. 
3. PHYSICAL QUALITY SPECIFICATIONS 
OPTIMUM GRAIN shall meet the following specifications, or it shall be subject to the ELEVATOR'S 
discount schedule or rejection. 
a. The specifications for OPTIMUM GRAIN shall be: 
Moisture 15.0% Maximum 
Test Weight 54.0 lbs. Minimum 
BCFM 2.0% Maximum 
Damage 3.0% Maximum 
Aflatoxin < 20 ppb 
Odor Cool, sweet and of 
merchantable quality. 
Contamination For identity preserv^ 
Blending handling, no com grain 
from other types 
allowed and meets all 
U.S. No. 2 Yellow Com 
quality standards not 
listed above. 
OPTIMUM GRAIN 
blended with any non-
OPTIMUM GRAIN will 
not be accepted. 
b. If the moisture exceeds the above limits or has test weight less than the above minimum, the 
OPTIMUM GRAIN will be subject to rejection or discounts, and drying charges set forth by the 
receiving ELEVATOR. The following discounts apply for BCFM and damage. 
BCFM DISCOUNTS DAMAGE DISCOUNTS 
$0.02 Each 1.0% From $0.01 Each 1.0% From 
2.1-4.0% 3.1-5.0% 
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c. OPTIMUM GRAIN delivered under this Agreement shall be of merchantable quality, unadulterated 
and unrestricted from movement in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Environmental Protection Agency Tolerances, the United StatesGrain 
Standards Act and applicable state law. 
d. Any individual load of OPTIMUM GRAIN with greater than 20 PPB Aflatoxin, not cool and sweet, 
not of merchantable quality or rejected as a result of not meeting any of the specifications in this 
Agreement shall not be accepted and no premium will be paid for oil content. Such load(s) shall be 
subject to rejection or purchased as yellow com at the sole discretion of the ELEVATOR. Such 
load(s) shall not be commingled with other OPTIMUM GRAIN produced by GROWER. 
e. The ELEVATOR'S weights and grades shall govem with the exception that GROWER has the 
right to appeal any grading by having the elevator submit a sample to the Federal Grain Inspection 
Service (FGIS), at GROWER'S expense, for an official grade. 
f. GROWER will provide a representative sample of GROWER'S OPTIMUM GRAIN before delivery if 
requested by OPTIMUM. OPTIMUM will provide sample bags and sample shipping instructions to 
the GROWER. OPTIMUM or their representative shall have the right to sample bins of OPTIMUM 
GRAIN prior to delivery. 
4. PRICING AND GROWER COMPENSATION 
a. The ELEVATOR or OPTIMUM will compensate the GROWER for performing this Agreement. The 
compensation for a load of delivered, dried OPTIMUM GRAIN shall be the ELEVATOR cash price for 
U.S. No. 2 Yellow Com, basis the export market for commodity com on day of delivery (if not priced 
earlier with ELEVATOR), less any discounts, plus a premium based upon the oil content (see the 
SCALE below) times the total number of net bushels of the OPTIMUM GRAIN delivered. GROWER 
acknowledges that depending upon market conditions, the prk;ing of OPTIMUM GRAIN may be 
higher or lower than the local price of generic yellow com. The GROWER agrees to accept this 
export price as the final determination in the settlement of the OPTIMUM GRAIN. 
PREMIUM SCALE 
Less than 6.0% oil*, $0.00 per bushel 
6.0% oil $.05 per 7.0% oil $.15 per 
bu. bu. 
6.1% oil $.06 per 7.1% oil $.16 per 
bu. bu. 
6.2% oil $.07 per 7.2% oil $.17 per 
bu. bu. 
6.3% oil $.08 per 7.3% oil $.18 per 
bu. bu. 
6.4% oil $.09 per 7.4% oil $.19 per 
bu. bu. 
6.5% oil $.10 per 7.5% Oil $.20 per 
bu. bu. 
6.6% oil $.11 per 7.6% oil $.21 per 
bu. bu. 
6.7% oil $.12 per 7.7% oil $.22 per 
bu. bu. 
6.8% oil $.13 per 7.8% oil $.23 per 
bu. bu. 
6.9% oil $.14 per 7.9% oil $.24 per 
bu. bu. 
8.0% oil or greater $.25 per bu. 
*AII oil contents are expressed on a zero moisture basis 
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b. In addition, DUPONT is offering a GROWER profit incentive of $15 per bag on each bag of TC 
BLEND® seed you buy from participating OPTIMUM HOC seed companies. To qualify for the 2000 
DuPont Bonus Program, grower must utilize qualifying DuPont Crop Protection Products on 50% or 
more of their total com acres. For additional information on this incentive, call 1 -888-6-DUPONT. 
c. Oil content of OPTIMUM GRAIN shall be determined by the ELEVATOR, utilizing a grain analyzer 
with an OPTIMUM approved calibration for OPTIMUM GRAIN, on a representative sample drawn 
from each load. Details of the sampling and measurement procedure may be obtained from the 
ELEVATOR. 
d. In the event of a disagreement or dispute related to oil content, the GROWER may request that 
such sample be re-analyzed. The oil content for determining the premium due shall be the average 
value of the two sample measurements. If the GROWER requests a third party analysis, then 
GROWER has the right, at GROWER'S expense, to have ELEVATOR submit the same sample to 
the Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS). The parties agree that the oil content as determined by 
FGIS shall be used to determine the premium for the OPTIMUM GRAIN. 
e. If a grain analyzer with an OPTIMUM approved calibration for OPTIMUM GRAIN is not available 
at the ELEVATOR when the GROWER delivers the OPTIMUM GRAIN, then GROWER shall allow 
ELEVATOR reasonable time to obtain oil analysis. 
5. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
GROWER is, for purposes of this Agreement, an independent contractor and nothing contained in 
this Agreement shall make GROWER an employee or agent of OPTIMUM or ELEVATOR or 
authorize him/her to act on behalf of OPTIMUM or ELEVATOR. GROWER shall indemnify, defend 
and hold OPTIMUM or ELEVATOR harmless from all claims in any way connected directly or 
indirectly with GROWER'S operations pursuant to this Agreement. 
6. DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTY AND LIMITATION OF DAMAGES 
Actual total oil content of the OPTIMUM GRAIN produced by the GROWER will vary and is 
influenced by factors such as variety selected, date of planting, occurrence of disease, insects 
including com rootworm beetle, accumulated growing degree days during the growing season, 
contaminating pollination by non-high oil com varieties, failure to follow the recommended method of 
use, and the breakdown of male sterility of the hybrid seed com incorporated in the TC BLEND® 
seed under adverse weather conditions, all of which are beyond the control of OPTIMUM. OPTIMUM 
MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE OR ANY OTHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY. 
NO CLAIM OF ANY KIND, WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON NEGLIGENCE, SHALL BE 
GREATER IN AMOUNT THAN THE VALUE OF COMMERCIAL SEED IN A QUANTITY 
COMPARABLE TO THAT QUANTITY OF SEED SUBJECT TO THIS AGREEMENT. NEITHER 
PARTY SHALL BE LIABLE FOR SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY, OR 
INDIRECT DAMAGES AND THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES SHALL BE WITHOUT REGARD TO 
THE CAUSE RELATIVE THERETO AND WHETHER OR NOT CAUSED BY OR RESULTING 
FROM THE NEGLIGENCE OF SUCH PARTY. 
7. MISCELLANEOUS 
a. This Agreement constitutes the complete and exclusive statement of the understanding between 
the parties and supersedes all prior and collateral representations. Any alteration, modification, or 
amendment of the Agreement shall not be valid and binding unless in writing and signed by both 
parties. This Agreement shall bind parties hereto, their heirs, administrators, executors, successors, 
and assigns. 
b. This Agreement shall t>e governed by Iowa law, without regard to conflict of law principles. 
OPTIMUM and GROWER agree that all disputes and differences arising between OPTIMUM and 
GROWER out of or relating in any way to this Agreement, the construction, meaning and operation, 
or effect of this Agreement, or breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the 
rules and regulations of the National Grain and Feed Association pursuant to such Association's 
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grain arbitration rules. OPTIMUM and GROWER agree that judgment may be entered upon any 
arbitration award in any court of competent jurisdiction. 
0. Neither OPTIMUM nor the GROWER may assign this agreement without prior written consent of 
the other party. Written notice to OPTIMUM shall be by personal delivery or by postage paid letter 
addressed to Optimum Quality Grains, L.L.G., PO Box 2, Johnston, lA 50131-0002 
8. LAND OWNER 
If GROWER does not own a field used for the production of the OPTIMUM GRAIN under the terms 
of this Agreement, he/she shall indicate the name(s) of the owner(s) below. Any method of payment 
other than directly to GROWER shall be indicated below. 
9. ACCEPTANCE BY OPTIMUM and ELEVATOR'S RIGHT OF REFUSAL 
This Agreement is not binding until signed by both GROWER and OPTIMUM. GROWER must 
present this Agreement to ELEVATOR for OTPIMUM to sign. 
ELEVATOR reserves the right, at its sole discretion, to refuse to accept this Agreement from 
GROWER prior to its being signed by OPTIMUM. If ELEVATOR chooses to exercise this option, 
ELEVATOR will notify GROWER that GROWER'S offer to produce OPTIMUM GRAIN has been 
rejected. 
OPTIMUM QUALITY GRAINS, L.L.C.: 
By: 
Date: 
GROWER: 
By; 
Date: 
GROWER (signature) 
When filling out the information below please PRINT CLEARLY with a ball point pen: 
Grower Name: GrowerOisplayName 
Company Name (if any): CompanyOisplayName 
Street or box number: ADDRESS1, A0DRESS2 
City, State, Zip Code, Phone: CITY, STATE PostalCD, PHONE 
"Complete, legible name and address required for Agreement to be valid. 
NON-OBJECTION BY LANDOWNER(S): 
By: 
LANDOWNER 
ADDRESS/rOWN 
* Optimum® is a registered trademark of Optimum Quality Grains, L.L.C. 
* TC BLEND® is a registered trademark of Optimum Quality Grains, L.L.C. 
Version: Version 
Attachment A 
Ag Source 
Ag Venture, Inc. 
AgriGold 
Agripro Seeds, Inc. 
Asgrow 
Beck's Superior Hybrids, Inc. 
Bo-Jac Hybrid Com Co. 
Brown Seed Farms, Inc. 
Burrus Bros. & Assoc. Growers 
OPTIMUM® HIGH OIL CORN 
SEED COMPANY LIST FOR 2000 
Horizon Seed Genetics 
Hughes Hybrids 
L. G. Seeds, Inc. 
Legend Seeds, Inc. 
Lewis Hybrids, Inc. 
Mark Seed Company 
NC+ Hybrids 
Novartis Seeds, Inc. 
Patriot Seeds, Inc. 
I l l  
Cargill 
Callahan Seeds 
Croplan Genetics 
Crows Hybrid Com Company 
DeKalb Genetics Corporation 
Diener Seeds, Inc. 
Garst Seed Company 
Golden Harvest/Ganvood 
Golden Harvest/Golden Seed Co. 
Golden Harvest/JC Robinson Seed Co. 
Golden Harvest/Sommer Brothers 
Golden Harvest/Thorp 
Great Lakes Hybrids 
Growmark, Inc. 
Gutwein, Fred & Sons, Inc. 
Hawkeye Hybrids, Inc. 
Hoblit Seed Co. 
Hoegemeyer Enterprises, Inc. 
Pfister Hybrid Com Company 
Pioneer Hi-Bred international. Inc. 
Prime Farm Seeds, Inc. 
Producers Hybrids, Inc. 
Sand Seed Service 
Schlessman Seed Co. 
Seed Consultants 
Select Seed Hybrids, Inc. 
Sieben Hybrids, Inc. 
Stewart Seeds, Inc. 
Stone Seed Farms, Inc. 
Top Farm Hybrids 
Trelay Farms, Inc. 
Trisler Seed Farms, Inc. 
UAP Seeds Co. 
Wilson Seeds, Inc. 
Wyffels Hybrids, Inc. 
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